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Since 2005, the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines have become
an essential part of the practice of family law throughout Canada.
Aimed at structuringdiscretionaryspousalsupport determinationsunder
the Divorce Act and increasing the fairness of awards, the Advisory
Guidelines have been embracedby appellate courts acrossjurisdictions.
Quebec is the exception to that trend. Despite that marriageand divorce
fall under federal jurisdiction, Quebec courts resist the application of
these non-binding rules, written by two family law scholars. This article
responds to Quebec's resistance to the Advisory Guidelines and suggests
that concerns about them may be misplaced. By reviewing the history
of Quebec's legislative approach to married spouses, it suggests that
antipathy toward the Advisory Guidelines, based on theirfailureto reflect
Quebec matrimonial law, is misguided. Rather,judicial approaches in
Quebec based on autonomy and economic independence fail to reflect
the reality of both the provincial and federal legislative landscapes
respecting marriageand divorce.
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L'obligation alimentaire entre tpoux au Qujbec: la risistance aux
Lignes directrices facultatives
Depuis 2005, les Lignes directrices facultatives en matibre de pensions
alimentaires pour 6poux sont devenues un outil incontournable de la
pratiquedu droitde lafamille travers le Canada.Les Lignes directrices
visent accroitre la pr visibilit et la coherence des ordonnances
alimentairesen vertu de la Loi sur le divorce. Elles ont etfavorablement
accueillies par les cours d'appel travers le pays. Le Que bec fait
cependantfigure d'exception. Bien que le mariage et le divorce relevent
de la compftence fMddrale, les tribunaux qu becois sont reticents i
appliquer ces rgles non contraignantes,rdigdes par deux professeurs
de droitfamilial. Le pr, sent articleprend le contrepied de la r, sistance
qu becoise aux Lignes directrices et il avance que les pre occupations
qu'elles suscitent au Que bec sont injustifiees. A l'aide de l'examen
historique de l'approche lgislative du Qu, bec applicables aux epoux
mari s, l'articlesuggre que la reserve envers les Lignes directrices,bas&e
sur l'ide qu'elles ne refieteraientpas le droit matrimonialqu becois, est
erron&e. Selon l'auteure, l'approchejudiciairequ becoise qui met l'accent
sur les notions d'autonomie et d'ind pendance economique est en porteu-faux avec la legislation, tant provinciale que fidrale,en matire de
mariage et de divorce.

Pensiones alimenticias para c6nyuges en Quebec: La resistencia a las
Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines
Desde el aho 2005 las Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (directivas
facultativas de pensiones alimenticiaspara c6nyuges) se han convertido
en un elemento esencial en la prdctica del derecho de familia en todo
Canadd. Estas tienen como prop6sito estructurardiscrecionalmentelas
decisiones vinculadas con la manutenci6n del c6nyuge, bajo la Ley sobre
el Divorcio, y mejorar la imparcialidadde losfallos. Estas directivashan
sido adoptadaspor las Cortes de Apelaciones a trav s de las diferentes
jurisdicciones.Sin embargo, la provincia de Quebec es la excepci6n a
esta tendencia. A pesarde que el matrimonio y el divorcio se encuentran
bajo jurisdicci6nfederal, las cortes de la provinciade Quebec se oponen
a la aplicaci6n de estas reglas no vinculantes, que han sido redactadas
por dos estudiosos del derecho de familia. Este artfculo contesta la
resistencia que opone Quebec para aplicar estas directivas, y explica

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3331275

J. LAZARE

Spousal Support in Quebec ...

que dichas cuestiones estdn fuera de lugar.Al examinar la historia del
enfoque legislativo de Quebec con respecto a los c6nyuges, se expone
la aversi6n hacia estas directivas basdndose en susfallas, reflejdndose
asf que las leyes matrimoniales de Quebec son desacertadas. Mds
bien, el enfoque judicial de Quebec basado en la autonomfa y en la
independencia econ6mica no refleja la realidad de ambos panoramas
legislativos,provincialyfederal, con respecto al matrimonioy al divorcio.
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For more than a decade, judges across Canada have been relying on
the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines when adjudicating the financial
consequences of divorce. In short, the Advisory Guidelinesuse one of two
formulas, depending whether there are dependent children of the marriage,
to assist with the determination of spousal support by structuring the

1.

"Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines", prepared
by Carol ROGERSON and Rollie THOMPSON, 2008, [Online], [www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/
fl-lf/spousal-epoux/spag/pdf/SSAG eng.pdf] (November 1st, 2018) (hereafter''Advisory
Guidelines").
CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
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broad grant of judicial discretion contained in the DivorceAct 2. The Advisory Guidelines do not deal with entitlement to support, but rather, guide
the awarding of support in the presence of a proven claim 3. Moreover,
they do not preclude the statutorily mandated exercise of judicial discretion; instead, they provide ranges of both amount and duration of support,
which will depend on the spouses' incomes and the length of the marriage 4.
Further, the Advisory Guidelines facilitate the exercise of judicial discretion by enumerating a number of exceptions to their applicability 5. Overall,
their aim is to assist with complex determinations and to bring some clarity
and foreseeability to an area of law historically characterized by its uncertainty and, at times, its unfairness 6. Importantly, while their creation was
supported by Canada's Department of Justice, the Advisory Guidelines do
not emanate from government. They were written by two Canadian family
law scholars, in consultation with an Advisory Working Group of family
law professionals and stakeholders, and are rooted in the relevant case law
as it had developed prior to their creation7 . An example of the move away
from discretion in resolving family law disputes, the Advisory Guidelines,
like the mandatory Child Support Guidelines8 , align with broader national
and international trends toward a more accessible family justice system 9.

2. Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.), art. 15.2.
3. See Advisory Guidelines, supra, note 1, p. 2.
4. See id., chap. 3.3.
5. See id., chap. 12.
6. See id., p. 12. See also Carol ROGERSON and Rollie THOMPSON, "The Canadian
Experiment with Spousal Support Guidelines", (2011) 45 Fain. L.Q. 241; Nicholas BALA,
"Judicial Discretion and Family Law Reform in Canada", (1986) 5 Can. J. Fain. L. 15;
Carol ROGERSON, "Spousal Support Post-Bracklow: The Pendulum Swings Again?",
(2001) 19 Can. J. Fain. L. 185 (the latter two on the risk of unfairness inherent in
discretionary spousal support determinations).
7. See Advisory Guidelines, supra, note 1, at chap. 2; CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
"Developing Spousal Support Guidelines in Canada: Beginning the Discussion",
prepared by Carol ROGERSON, 2002, [Online], [www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/spousalepoux/ss-pae/pdf/ss-pae.pdf] (November 1St, 2018). The Advisory Group was composed
of lawyers and judges representing eight provinces (there was no representation from
New Brunswick or Prince Edward Island). While no Quebec judges participated, the
province was represented by three Quebec jurists: two lawyers experienced in family
law and one mediator. See Advisory Guidelines, supra, note 1, p. 157.
8. See Regulation respecting the determination of child support payments, CQLR c.
C-25.01, r. 0.4.
9. See Carol ROGERSON, "Shaping Substantive Law to Promote Access to Justice: Canada's
Use of Child and Spousal Support Guidelines", in Mavis MACLEAN, John EEKELAAR

and Benoit BASTARD (eds.), Delivering Family Justice in the 21st Century, Oxford, Hart
Publishing, 2015, p. 51.
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The degree to which the Advisory Guidelines have been embraced
varies across Canadian jurisdictions. Some courts of appeal have expressly
endorsed them10 , while others have simply upheld trial decisions where
they have been used. On the whole, it is fair to say that in most of Canada,
these non-binding guidelines have become the central tool in determining
spousal support and an essential element of the practice of family law 12.
Quebec, however, presents a different story. Judges in this province
have continually resisted the utility of the Advisory Guidelines and their
suitability for determining spousal support upon divorce in Quebec's civil
law jurisdiction 13. Scholars have likewise diminished their value 14. This
is not to suggest that Quebec spouses made economically vulnerable by
divorce in Quebec do not regularly succeed in claiming support. Rather,
this article is premised on the idea that the frequent failure to consider the
Advisory Guidelines often results in lower awards, that do not adequately
compensate for the economic losses suffered during marriage, or respond
to the economic vulnerability often generated by the interdependence that
characterizes marriage. Moreover, the absence of guidance that would
come from regular consideration of the Advisory Guidelines means that
the discretionary granting of spousal support remains unpredictable and
seemingly arbitrary 15.
This article responds to that resistance by examining the basis for
Quebec's distinctive approach to adjudicating spousal support claims
following a divorce. It does so by suggesting that resistance to the Advisory
Guidelines may be grounded in unfounded beliefs about Quebec's system

10.

See e.g. Yemchuk v. Yemchuk, 2005 BCCA 406; Redpath v. Redpath, 2006 BCCA 338;
Fisher v.Fisher,2008 ONCA 11.
11. See e.g. De Winter v. De Winter, 2013 ABCA 311; Linn v. Frank,2014 SKCA 87.
12. See Scott BOOTH, "The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: Avoiding Errors and
Unsophisticated Use", (2009) 28 Can. Fain. L.Q. 339. Itis worth noting that attitudes
toward the Advisory Guidelines across other Canadian provinces are not uniform.
Not all appellate courts have endorsed their use. See Neighbour v. Neighbour, 2014
ABCA 62; MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2017 NSCA 18. Critiques emanating from
Quebec courts, however, seem more forceful, and are uniquely grounded in the content
of the Advisory Guidelines.
13. See detailed discussion below, in Part 1, of Quebec judicial treatment of the Advisory
Guidelines.
14. See Jocelyn JARRY et al., "Lignes directrices facultatives en matiere de pensions
alimentaires pour epoux - Pertinence de leur application au Quebec?", (2016)
31 C.J.L.S. 243.
15. See Droit de lafamille 112606, 2011 QCCA 1554 ("Simplement, les Lignes directrices
facultatives cherchent A encadrer le processus de d6termination de la pension, de
maniere A en minimiser les effets d'imprevisibilite et d'arbitraire", par. 95) (hereafter
"DF 112606"); C. ROGERSON, supra, note 6, 252.
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of matrimonial law, specifically, the centrality of notions of autonomy
and individualism, rooted in a formal conception of gender equality. The
article argues that this outlook is based on former legislative policies and
judicial beliefs, which have since, to a large degree, become obsolete. Moreover, judicial scepticism toward the Advisory Guidelines also does not
correspond with the applicable federal law on spousal support and thus,
is less likely to adequately respond to the economic interdependence that
typically results from marriage and the financial vulnerability commonly
associated with divorce.
Part 1 provides background to the critique that follows by setting
out the Quebec courts' responses to the Advisory Guidelines. A close
reading of the relevant decisions shows that judicial resistance to the Advisory Guidelines is in large part rooted in perceived problems with their
substance. Following this, Part 2 suggests that the substantive opposition to the Advisory Guidelines stems from the legal and social weight
of the concepts of choice and individual autonomy in Quebec family law,
particularly in the context of marriage and matrimonial relations. More
specifically, it aims to demonstrate that the refusal of some Quebec trial
judges to apply the Advisory Guidelinesmay stem from the rejection of the
substantive theory of equality espoused by the Supreme Court in favour
of a formal conception of liberal equality characterized by individualism,
autonomy, choice, and contractual freedom. By privileging independence
and individual choice, the Quebec law of spousal support diminishes the
value of work undertaken for the sake of the family, such as child care,
which is typically performed by women, and which often impacts women's
economic positions upon divorce.
With that background in place, Part 3 suggests that the emphasis on
individualism and free choice does not align with much of the positive
law of the province. The historical development of the province's matrimonial law suggests that while the rhetoric of individualism and choice
is forceful in Quebec, it does not reflect the current legislative context,
wherein the bulk of family law reforms have resulted in the almost complete
removal of economic freedom for most married couples16 . Part 4 goes on

16.

The review of the historical development of Quebec matrimonial law focuses more on
the evolution of matrimonial property law than on the provincial law of spousal support
or maintenance. This is because prior to Parliament's adoption of the first statute
governing divorce (Divorce Act, S.C. 1967-68, c. 24), divorce was not granted in the
province. Instead, couples in Quebec (and Newfoundland) seeking a divorce had to ask
for the passage of a private member's bill in Parliament. There was, in other words, no
law governing divorce and corollary relief in Quebec prior to 1968. See F.J.E. JORDAN,
"The Federal Divorce Act (1968) and the Constitution", (1968) 14 McGill L.J. 209;
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to demonstrate that while some Quebec judges do refer to the leading
Supreme Court of Canada decisions interpreting the spousal support provisions of the Divorce Act, resistance to the Advisory Guidelines is also out
of step with the applicable federal law of divorce.
With its focus on Quebec family law, this article necessarily draws
on some literature related to the lively debate around the legal status of
unmarried cohabitants. The focus, however, is on married spouses, as
the question of spousal support-and the related issue of reliance on the
Advisory Guidelines-does not, at present, apply to individuals in a de
facto union in Quebec17 . Further, while the Advisory Guidelines question
applies equally to heterosexual and same-sex married couples, the majority
of the case law and literature on spousal support is rooted in the traditional
gender division that has historically informed debates around the economic
consequences of divorce-that is, a gendered division of domestic labour
wherein women shoulder a disproportionate share of the burden of social
reproduction and domestic responsibility. The article is thus premised on
the idea that the Advisory Guidelines are a valuable tool in the promotion
of substantive gender equality, based, as they are, on the recognition of the
economic value of domestic work and the need to redress the historically
unequal effects of marriage breakdown on women.
1

Judicial Resistance to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines

Since their first appearance in a Quebec courtroom, the Advisory
Guidelineshave been approached with ambivalence, at best, and hostility,
at worst 8 . With time, judges appeared to warm to them; eventually, the
Quebec Court of Appeal expressly endorsed the Advisory Guidelines and

Divorce Law in Canada, Ottawa, Parliamentary Information
and Research Service, revised in 2008. Note, however, that spousal support pursuant
to the Civil Code was available for spouses separated from bed and board, but not
divorced. While there is overlap between the two forms of spousal support - following
separation, or divorce - as they are applied in Quebec, the focus of this article is on
the granting of spousal support pursuant to the Divorce Act, as a corollary measure
to a judgment in divorce.
See Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, 2013 SCC 5.
As is developed below, much of the resistance appears to be grounded on the substance
of the Advisory Guidelines - that is, on the way they interpret the federal law on
divorce. Objections, however, are not limited to substance; judges also object to their
non-legislated form. The arguments presented here are limited to the substantive, or
content-based objection. This should not, however, be taken as an endorsement of
objections based on form, which might also be proven unsustainable. The form-based
objection, rooted in the distinctly civilian hierarchy of legal sources, will be addressed
in separate work.
LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT,

17.
18.
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directed trial judges to model their reasoning on spousal support on the
behaviour of their counterparts in the common law provinces. In spite of
that endorsement, however, some Quebec trial judges continue to refuse to
meaningfully consider the Advisory Guidelines,with the result that awards
in Quebec may be more difficult to predict, and are often lower than in
the rest of the country. This Part will explain the basis for opposition to
them, a crucial first step before suggesting that resistance to the Advisory
Guidelines may rest on shaky ground.
The rest of Canada has taken a different approach. Upon their first
release in draft form in 2005, judges outside of Quebec displayed openness
to the Advisory Guidelines19. Since then, some appellate courts-notably,
in British Columbia, Ontario, and New Brunswick-have been nothing less
than enthusiastic about the potential of the Advisory Guidelines to remedy
many of the demonstrated difficulties associated with the discretionary
granting of spousal support 20 . Others, such as Alberta and Nova Scotia,
have been less keen to see their discretion limited to matters of entitlement and, as a general matter, have not embraced the Advisory Guidelines
with the same eagerness 21 . None of the common law courts, however, have
expressed the same attitude toward the Advisory Guidelines as the Quebec
courts, where they have been met with hostility on the part of both trial
judges and, at first, the Quebec Court of Appeal. As a result, the Advisory
Guidelineshave not had the same dramatic impact in Quebec as in the rest
of Canada. In consequence, awards may be less reflective of the judicially
entrenched principle of substantive equality in spousal support 22.
1.1

Quebec Judges United in Opposition

The appearance of the Advisory Guidelines in Quebec was accompanied by their swift rejection. They were first mentioned in a Quebec
judgment in 2005, when they were still in draft form. In that decision, their
unfinished, or experimental, quality spurred Justice Corriveau's cautious

19.
20.
21.
22.

See e.g. Yemchuk v. Yemchuk, supra,note 10; Fisherv. Fisher,supra, note 10.
See e.g. S.C. v. J.C., 2006 NBCA 46; Smith v. Smith, 2011 NBCA 66. See also
C. ROGERSON and R. THOMPSON, supra, note 6.
See Neighbour v. Neighbour, supra, note 12; Strecko v. Strecko, 2014 NSCA 66;
MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2017 NSCA 18.
For further discussion of the judicial entrenchment of substantive equality principles
in spousal support law, see Susan ENGEL, "Compensatory Support in Moge v. Moge
and the Individual Model of Responsibility: Are We Headed in the Right Direction?",
(1993) 57 Sask. L. Rev. 397; Carol ROGERSON, "Spousal Support After Moge", (1996) 14
Can. Far. L.Q. 281; Dominique GOUBAU, "Une nouvelle ere pour la pension alimentaire
entre ex-conjoints au Canada", (1993) 72 Can. B. Rev. 279.
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refusal to apply them: "Dans leur forme actuelle, elles sont pr6sent6es pour
commentaires en vue d'une r6vision. II serait certainement pr6matur6 de
vouloir les appliquer telles qu'elles sont 23'' . More revealing illustrations of
Quebec judges' attitude toward them came the following year, when the
Advisory Guidelines were rejected not only for their unofficial character,
but also for their content. Justice Gendreau wrote, "le Tribunal n'est pas un
banc d'essai ou un laboratoire de recherche", making it clear that Quebec
judges were not interested in these non-binding rules 24, as did the inference that they do not properly reflect the law or the case law on spousal
support 25. Specifically, given their emphasis on the length of the marriage 26,
Justice Julien suggested that the Advisory Guidelines distort the requirement, in the DivorceAct and the relevant case law, that equal weight should
be granted to each of the enumerated objectives and factors that go into
a support award 27 .
Later parts of this article will elaborate on the disconnect between
this approach and that espoused by the Supreme Court of Canada in interpreting the Divorce Act. But read on their own, it is clear from Quebec
judges' earliest interactions with the Advisory Guidelines, that opposition
was based substantially on their content. Despite that divorce is a matter
of federal jurisdiction, interpretations of the law on spousal support differ
between Quebec and the rest of Canada.
Quebec judges did not appear to immediately grasp the potential of the
Advisory Guidelines to benefit divorcing spouses. Indeed, both negotiation
theory and experience with their use suggest that reliance on guidelines to
direct an otherwise discretionary determination advantages parties in at
least two important ways 2 . First, by creating a reference point for potential awards, guidelines inform negotiations and even the playing field for
claimant spouses. Second, the existence of a set range of support outcomes
means that spouses who may otherwise be deterred by the uncertainty
23.
24.
25.
26.

27.
28.

M.F. c. N.C., 2005 CanLIl 13719 (QC C.S.), par. 200.
B.D. c. S.D.U., 2006 QCCS 1033, par. 20.
D.S. c. M.S.C., 2006 QCCS 334, par. 40 and 41.
See Advisory Guidelines, supra, note 1 ("Under the Advisory Guidelines length of
marriage is a primary determinant of support outcomes in cases without dependent
children. [...]
Length of marriage is much less relevant under the with child support
formula, although itstill
plays a significant role in determining duration under that
formula", p. 33).
D.S. c. M.S.C., supra, note 25, par. 40.
See Robert H. MNOOKIN and Lewis KORNHAUSER, "Bargaining in the Shadow of the

Law: The Case of Divorce", (1979) 88 Yale L.J. 950; Craig MARTIN, "Unequal Shadows:
Negotiation Theory and Spousal Support Under Canadian Divorce Law", (1998) 56 U.
Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 135; C. ROGERSON, supra, note 9.
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of results are more likely to claim the support owed to them. Both these
factors, by limiting room for disagreement to the established range, have
been demonstrated to reduce litigation among divorcing spouses, thus
increasing access to justice 29. In writing that the judicial application of
the Advisory Guidelines would introduce a context of uncertainty for
litigants 30 , Justice Julien appeared to have been referring to an uncertainty relative to their use. She suggested that parties wanting to invoke
the Advisory Guidelines might be tempted to push for litigation where the
opposing party disagrees, thus engendering the perverse effect of encouraging litigation over resolution by mutual agreement 31 . As the Advisory
Guidelines were still in their infancy in 2006, uncertainty as to the consequences of their use was understandable; Quebec courts could not have
predicted the significant ways that the Advisory Guidelines would impact
the determination of spousal support or the speed with which they would
come to form an essential part of the practice of divorce law throughout
the rest of Canada.
The Quebec Court of Appeal quickly approved of trial judges' initial
approach. In 2006, citing the Supreme Court's earlier statement that there
is no "magic recipe" for carrying out the difficult analysis required by the
law of spousal support 32, the Court of Appeal endorsed Justice Julien's
cautious approach 33. Referring to the decision under appeal, in which the
claimant invoked the Advisory Guidelines and the trial judge's support
order fell within their range, Justice Forget, on behalf of a unanimous
Court of Appeal, wrote that the trial judge erred in dispensing with the

29.

While empirical research on this question remains to be done, the authors of theAdvisory
Guidelines observe that in the years following their increased use, reported decisions
in jurisdictions where they are regularly applied tend to deal with more "complex"
questions - for example, where the payor spouse has custody of children. Simpler cases,
then, where "a higher-income payor pays child and spousal support to a lower-income
parent with custody or primary care of the children" now occupy less of the courts'
time, despite that "this is by far the most common custodial arrangement". In other
words, there is some indication that straightforward spousal support determinations
no longer require parties to resort to the courts. See CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Spousal SupportAdvisory Guidelines: The Revised User's Guide, 2016, p. 33, [Online],
[www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/fl-lf/spousal-epoux/ug al-gu al/pdf/ug al-gu al.pdf]
(November 1st, 2018). See also Carol ROGERSON, "Child Support, Spousal Support

and the Turn to Guidelines", in John
30.
31.
32.
33.

EEKELAAR

and Rob

GEORGE

(eds.), Routledge

Handbook of Family Law and Policy,London, Routledge, 2014, p. 153, at page 162.
D.S. c. M.S.C., supra, note 25, par. 38.
Id.
Referring to Moge v. Moge, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 813, 853, 99 DLR (4th) 456 ("There are no
easy recipes nor are there neat compartments on which to rely", 871).
G.V c. C.G., 2006 QCCA 763.
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individualized analysis required by law 34. The Court of Appeal reduced
the award by nearly 40 per cent of the original order 35, thus confirming the
idea that the Advisory Guidelines do not reflect the substance of Quebec
matrimonial law.
1.2 A Divided Approach
Despite the Court of Appeal's opposition to the Advisory Guidelines,
trial judges eventually looked to them again. In 2010, four years after the
Court of Appeal rejected them, Justice Masse wrote that even if they are not
binding, the Advisory Guidelines may be an element to consider in determining spousal support 36. One year later, a unanimous Court of Appeal
re-evaluated its earlier approach and issued an unambiguous endorsement
of the Advisory Guidelines37 . In reversing its earlier position, the Court of
Appeal responded to the many critiques expressed in various decisions,
ultimately concluding that, as they are analogous to scholarship, Quebec
judges should, as a general matter, be encouraged to apply them 3 . Justice
Bich wrote of their many virtues and their general usefulness in that "elles
favorisent une d6termination moins arbitraire du montant des pensions
entre ex-6poux 39 '' . She lauded the excellence of arguments in favour of their
use and encouraged Parliament to adopt them and "d'en imposer l'usage40 ' .
But Justice Bich stopped short of requiring trial judges to justify their
departure from the Advisory Guidelinesand mandating their use, because
they are not mandatory in law and "les tribunaux ne peuvent, en droit, 6tre
li6s par elles ni oblig6s [...] d'en faire usage 41". Thus, in addition to inviting
Parliament to act, the Quebec Court of Appeal instructed trial judges to
consider it "une bonne pratique" to refer to the Advisory Guidelines and to
draw inspiration from the practice of the other provinces where their use
"fait partie de l'ordinaire ou est plus r6pandu qu'au Qu6bec 42'". In short, the
Court of Appeal called for a new approach to spousal support determinations, in line with that of the common law provinces.

34.
35.
36.

Id., par. 120.
Id., par. 147.
Droit de lafamille 101242, 2010 QCCS 3334, varied on other grounds Droit de la
famille 103253, 2010 QCCA 2172.
37. DF 112606, supra, note 15.
38. Id., par. 110.
39. Id., par. 125.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id., par. 126.
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The clear expression of support for the Advisory Guidelines was not
enough to change judicial attitudes in Quebec. In the year following the
Court of Appeal's endorsement, the early hostility expressed toward the
Advisory Guidelines once again took hold. In 2012, the Superior Court
re-characterized the Court of Appeal's statements, minimizing the virtues
of the Advisory Guidelines as described by Justice Bich and emphasizing
the error inherent in exclusive reliance on them 43. What is more, the Superior Court issued a forceful criticism of the Advisory Guidelines,reiterating
that they do not reflect the law in Quebec, questioning their basic premises,
and calling them conceptually defective in their application to the facts
before the court, all in the name of Quebec specificity 44.
From then on, trial judges in Quebec have continued to minimize
the impact of the Court of Appeal's approval of the Advisory Guidelines.
Decisions persist in citing the concern, first expressed in 2006, that reliance on them would constitute an unacceptable shortcut and an illegitimate
circumvention of the statutory analysis dictated by the Divorce Act 4 5.
This attitude endures despite another reference by the Court of Appeal
to the instructive and useful nature of the Advisory Guidelines in calculating support 6 . While some more recent trial decisions indicate a slight
trend toward increasing acceptance of the Advisory Guidelines47 , the initial
resistance to them, and the fact that Quebec lags a decade behind the
rest of Canada with respect to their application, are revealing of judicial
understandings of the role and function of spousal support in Quebec
law 48 . As a means of gaining insight into fundamental conceptions about
Quebec matrimonial law-and of using that insight to dispel common
misconceptions-this article maintains that the situation merits study.
Before exploring these issues further, it is useful to set out the legislative and social context in which Quebec spousal support determinations
are made.

43.

Droit de lafamille

44.
45.
46.
47.

Id., par. 40, 42, 46 and 51.
D.S. c. M.S.C., supra, note 25, cited in Droit de lafamille 14165, 2014 QCCS 403.
Droit de lafamille 14175, 2014 QCCA 216.
See e.g. Droit de lafamille 152586, 2015 QCCS 4781; Droit de lafamille 151740, 2015
QCCS 3284.
Note that resistance to the Advisory Guidelinesin Quebec is not limited to the judiciary.
A recent study by four prominent family law scholars and practitioners argues against
their relevance. See J. JARRY et al., supra,note 14. More about this will be said below,
in Part 4.

48.

123274, 2012 QCCS 5873, par. 37 and 38.
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Spousal Support in Quebec: Solidarity and Autonomy
in a Federal State

This Part provides the background necessary to understand and
critique Quebec's approach to spousal support. The discussion is premised
on the idea that the judicial approach in Quebec informs the common rejection of the Advisory Guidelines. Because Quebec enjoys a distinct system
of private law, drawing lines between federal and provincial competence
is not a simple exercise. This Part will therefore begin by clarifying the
"imprecise boundaries" of legislative jurisdiction over the family in the
Canadian federation 49, as power to regulate the family is shared between
the federal government and the provinces. This Part will then set out two
distinct understandings of spousal support in Quebec, evidenced by the
relevant judgments: the "needs and means" model of support-grounded in
the relevant provisions of the Civil Code-and support based on the values
of free choice and economic independence-central themes of Quebec
private law. These conceptions will inform the subsequent demonstration
of the apparent error inherent in judicial resistance to the Advisory Guidelines as rooted in the basic premises of Quebec matrimonial law.
2.1

Shared Jurisdiction Over the Family

Quebec has a strong claim to jurisdiction over family matters. The
province has enjoyed its own system of private law since the proclamation
of the Act of Quebec of 177450, long before Confederation, and nearly a
century before the constitutional drafters turned their minds to the regulation of marriage and divorce 51. Indeed, it is fair to say that historically,
as an integral part of "private law", Quebec enjoyed exclusive jurisdiction
over the regulation of matrimonial law. Since Confederation, however,
jurisdictional lines have become blurred, as constitutional authority over
the regulation of "Marriage and Divorce" now rests with Parliament 52.
Further, the adoption of the federal DivorceAct as a uniform law applicable
across provincial lines means that the federal law on divorce applies in
Quebec 53. While, at Confederation, the inclusion of marriage and divorce
among federal powers may have been contentious 54, there is little debate
49.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See John DEWAR, "FAMILIES", in Peter CANE and Mark TUSHNET (eds.), The Oxford

Handbook of'Legal Studies, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 413.
The Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. III, c. 83 (U.K.).
See F.J.E. JORDAN, supra, note 16.
Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vic., c. 3 (U.K.), art. 91 (26), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985,
App. II, No 5.
Divorce Act, supra, note 2.
See F.J.E. JORDAN, supra, note 16.
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today that the Divorce Act, insofar as it establishes the grounds for divorce,
is valid federal legislation 55.
Where corollary relief in the form of support is concerned, it was not
always clear that regulating spousal and child support was a valid exercise
of the federal power. Indeed, these questions arguably lie at the heart of
the provincial power over "Matters of a merely local or private Nature in
the Province", as well as the provincial power over "Property and Civil
rights in the Province 56"' . Further, it was because of this constitutional
overlap that Parliament chose to leave the division of matrimonial property
following a divorce to the provinces57 . To do otherwise would have created
difficulties given the prior existence of matrimonial property legislation in
the provinces 5 . Thus, jurisdiction over divorce and its effects being shared
by the federal and provincial governments, Parliament's compromise lay
in regulating support, but not property division.
The Supreme Court has since upheld this decision as constitutionally
valid: while support is, in itself, a matter of provincial interest, as a necessary incident of divorce, the support provisions of the Divorce Act are

55.

For some, the legitimacy of the federal power over marriage, divorce, and corollary
relief in the context of a divorce remains controversial. A textual reading of the relevant
section of the Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 52, confirms that jurisdiction over
marriage and divorce lies with the federal government and, as discussed in the text
below, judicial interpretations of the federal statutory provisions dealing with support
have confirmed their constitutional validity. Nevertheless, the 2015 governmentcommissioned report on the future of Quebec family law illustrates the continued
resistance, on the part of its authors - members of the Comit4 consultatif sur le
droit de lafamille - to Parliament's jurisdiction over the family. In dealing with the
alimentary obligation between spouses, the committee members write that the original
justifications for the federal power over marriage and divorce - national uniformity
and respect for the freedom of religion of members of Quebec's religious minorities are no longer relevant today. Accordingly, the authors invite the Quebec government
to undertake negotiations with the federal government with the aim of recovering
provincial jurisdiction over marriage and divorce. At the time of writing, none of the
recommendations contained in the report have been put into effect. See QUEBEC,
COMITI CONSULTATIF SUR LE DROIT DE LA FAMILLE, Pour un droit de lafamille adapt4

56.

57.
58.

aux nouvelles rialitis conjugales etfamiliales, Montreal, Themis, 2015, p. 179 (hereafter
"Comiti consultatif'). Contra Suzanne PILON, "La pension alimentaire comme facteur
d'appauvrissement des femmes et des enfants en droit quebecois", (1993) 6 Can. J.
Women & L. 349 (recommending the harmonization of the Civil Code with the relevant
federal legislation, 367).
Constitution Act, 1867, supra, note 52, art. 92 (16) and 92 (13). See also Robert LECKEY,
Contextual Subjects. Family, State and Relational Theory, Toronto, University of
Toronto Press, 2008, p. 33.
See F.J.E. JORDAN, supra, note 16, 249.
Id., 262.
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rationally and functionally connected to the federal power and therefore
valid 59. This does not mean, however, that the provinces no longer legislate
in connection with support. As the application of the federal law is limited
to divorcing couples, the provinces still legislate support obligations during
marriage and upon legal separation (separation from bed and board in
Quebec 60 ), as well as, except in the case of Quebec, support obligations for
unmarried spouses 61. Thus, constitutional jurisdiction over family breakdown is shared between the different levels of government; support lies at
the intersection of federal and provincial powers.
Quebec's matrimonial law dates back much further than the federal
Divorce Act. The province has legislated familial obligations as it has
seen fit since the adoption of the province's first Civil Code in 1866, and
it continues to regulate support obligations between spouses today62.
As the Advisory Guidelines are based on judicial interpretations of the
Divorce Act, Quebec jurists may feel justified in approaching the Advisory Guidelines with caution. Indeed, in Canada's federal system, federal
laws are "frequently grounded in a policy that is incompatible with underlying civilian institutions 6"' . Thus, resistance might be based on a desire
to preserve provincial jurisdiction over a matter of historically private
law, which, in Quebec's civil law tradition, privileges legislation as the
paramount source of law 64 . Where Quebec judges might err, however, is in
seeming to base their resistance to the Advisory Guidelineson conceptions
of spousal support unique to Quebec and rooted in the Civil Code, which
does not make space for compensating the value of women's work in the
home once marriage comes to an end. As Part 3 of this article suggests,
these distinctive understandings of spousal support upon divorce have little
currency in today's legislative landscape. Before dealing with that question,
the following sections set out the Quebec approach.

59.

Zacks v. Zacks, [1973] S.C.R. 891, 35 D.L.R. (3d) 420. See also Jackson v. Jackson [1973]
S.C.R. 205, 29 D.L.R. (3d) 641; Papp v. Papp et al., [1970] 1 OR. 331 (ON C.A.).

60.
61.

See Civil Code ofQuibec, CQLR c. CCQ-1991, art. 493.
See e.g. Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3; Family Law Act, S.B.C. 2011, c. 25; Adult
Interdependent Relationships Act, S.A. 2002, c. A-4.5; Parenting and Support Act,

62.

R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 160.
See Civil Code of Quibec, supra, note 60, art. 585.

63.

John E.C. BRIERLEY and Roderick A. MACDONALD, Quebec Civil Law: An Introduction

64.

See Adrian Popovici, "Le droit civil, avant tout un style...", in Nicholas KASIRER

to Quebec Private Law, Toronto, Emond Montgomery Publications, 1993, p. 47.
(ed.), Le droit civil, avant tout un style?, Montreal, Themis, 2003, p. 207, at page 211;
John E.C. BRIERLEY, "The Civil Law in Canada", (1992) 84 Law. Libr. J. 159; Pierre

LEGRAND, 'Antiqui Juris Civilis Fabulas",(1995) 45 U.T.L.J. 311 (on the Civil Code as
a constitution and a "secular Bible", 327).
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The Civil Code's "Needs and Means" Model of Spousal Support

As a general matter, in Quebec, spousal support is often understood
neither as compensatory in nature nor as responding to any sort of freestanding obligation, resulting from the fact of marriage. In other words,
and as discussed below, the understanding of the alimentary obligation
in Quebec may not correspond with the theoretical underpinnings of
spousal support under the Divorce Act, on which the Advisory Guidelines
are based6 5 . This attitude may flow from the fact that prior to the adoption of the Divorce Act by the federal government, economic relief in the
form of support for divorcing spouses was simply not available in Quebec;
with the severance of matrimonial ties, came the end of any obligation of

support flowing from the marriage66 . Indeed, following a divorce, Quebec

law was said to treat the former spouses as strangers, with the effect that
the obligations of succour and assistance would disappear67 . In light of the
relationship of solidarity that is marriage-and the end of solidarity upon
divorce-some Quebec scholars describe the difficulty of reconciling the
continuing obligation of support with the end of the legal relationship 68 .
65.

66.

67.
68.

The Advisory Guidelines are grounded in the two theoretical foundations for spousal
support set out by the Supreme Court interpreting the Divorce Act. The first,
compensatory support, seeks to indemnify financially vulnerable spouses for their
contributions to the household, typically at the expense of their of financial well-being.
These negative economic impacts, commonly suffered by women, are understood as
helping to increase the financial status of their husbands. See Moge v. Moge, supra,
note 32. The second, the basic social obligation, or interdependency model of support,
is rooted in the inevitable interdependency between husbands and wives, and the
idea that long marriages result in financial intermingling which can be difficult if not
impossible to unravel. See Bracklow v. Bracklow, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, 169 D.L.R. (4th)
577. The Advisory Guidelines expressly encompass these two models of support. See
Advisory Guidelines, supra, note 1, p. 6-9.
Jean PINEAU and Marie PRATTE, Lafamille, Montreal, Themis, 2006, p. 318. See also
Jean CARBONNIER, Droit civil, t.2 "La famille, l'enfant, le couple", 21st ed., Paris, Presses
universitaires de France, 2002 (on the dissolution of matrimonial ties
upon divorce,
p. 601); Claire L'HEUREUX-DUBE, "The Quebec Experience: Codification of Family Law
and a Proposal for the Creation of a Family Court System", (1984) 44 Louisiana L. Rev.
1575 (describing the reform of Quebec family law in 1980, 1590). While the proposed
provisions on the effects of divorce never came into force due to constitutional barriers,
the Civil Code provided that "divorce extinguishes the right to claim support", subject
to a judicial order on a motion by one of the spouse's, thus reflecting the idea that
obligations between spouses are rooted primarily in the relationship of solidarity in
marriage; Jean PINEAU, Lafamille. Droit applicable au lendemain de la "Loi 89",
Montreal, Presses de l'Universite de Montreal, 1982, p. 145, note 68 (for the idea that a
parliamentary divorce, prior to the advent of the federal Divorce Act, did not give rise
to an action for support under the Civil Code of Lower Canada).
See J. PINEAU, supra, note 66, p. 173 and 174.
See e.g. J. PINEAU and M. PRATTE, supra, note 66, p. 318.
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The disconnect between Quebec's approach to support, and the rest of
Canada's, is not however limited to the context of divorce. In the case
of separation from bed and board, while the marriage bond subsists, so
does the alimentary obligation, as spouses are solidary in marriage 69 . But
even here, spousal solidarity in the face of separation only results in relief
"in the case of necessity 70"' , and not in an ongoing obligation grounded in
interdependency 71.
As divorce has the effect of severing the bond of solidarity, a literal
reading of the Civil Code would mean that the support obligation ceases
upon the pronouncement of divorce. In line with the dictates of the Civil
Code72, some Quebec judges, then, have traditionally conceived of support
as limited to addressing a current need and promoting the eventual selfsufficiency of the dependent spouse73 , and not as the natural continuation
of the economic partnership that is marriage. "Need" in this context is
understood as "les besoins de vie", such as food, clothing, lodging, heat
and medical care74 . Thus, while some authors make explicit the distinction
between the support obligation contained in the Civil Code and that which

69.
70.

71.
72.

73.

74.

See e.g. Civil Code of Quebec, supra, note 60, art. 392, 396 and 397.
Helene BELLEAU and Pascale CORNUT ST-PIERRE, "Conjugal Interdependence in
Quebec: From Legal Rules to Social Representations About Spousal Support and
Property Division on Conjugal Breakdown", (2014) 29 C.J.L.S. 43, 52.
See id. ("conjugal solidarity [...]
implicitly underscores a duty to provide help to a
spouse in financial difficulty", 51).
See Civil Code of Quebec, supra, note 60, art. 587 ("In awarding support, account is
taken of the needs and means of the parties, their circumstances and, as the case may
be, the time needed by the creditor of support to acquire sufficient autonomy"). Itis
interesting to note that unlike the progressive evolution of the province's matrimonial
property law, set out below, the alimentary obligation between spouses has remained
essentially unchanged throughout Quebec's legislative history. While consideration
of the spouse's conduct was removed following the creation of no-fault divorce at the
federal level, the family law reforms of 1980 saw art. 587 C.c.Q. replace the former
art. 212 C.c.L.C., which provided that in awarding support upon separation, in addition
to conduct, the court should take into account "the condition, means and other
circumstances" of the spouses. This failure to significantly evolve might explain some
of the resistance on the part of some Quebec judges to adopting the broader view of
spousal support espoused by the Supreme Court of Canada interpreting the Divorce
Act, and incorporated into the Advisory Guidelines.
See e.g. J.D. c. S.A., [2003] R.D.F. 181 (QC C.S.); G.L. c. N.F., [2004] R.D.F. 489
(QC C.A.), par. 73; S.S. c. P.C., [2005] J.Q. No 7121, J.E. 2005-1163 (QC C.S.); Droit de
lafamille 1221, 2012 QCCA 19. See also Robert LECKEY, "Developments in Family
Law: The 2012-2013 Term", (2014) 64 S.C.L.R. (2d) 241, 264.
See J.CARBONNIER, supra, note 66, p. 53. Carbonnier defines the alimentary obligation
as the obligation to "faire vivre" the creditor of support, to the extent of the debtor's
means.
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arises upon divorce7 5, it is commonplace that in Quebec, even in the case
of divorce, spousal support is regularly granted on the basis of the "needs
and means" of the parties and the promotion of economic independence,
often with little regard for compensatory principles7 6. Indeed, with some
exceptions7 7 , Quebec courts tend to resist the characterization of support
in compensatory terms, often preferring to limit support to situations of
clear need and financial dependence78 . While this approach aligns with the
alimentary obligation between spouses as historically understood, it does
not, as later parts of this article suggest, correspond with the most recent
reforms to the province's matrimonial laws.
This distinctive understanding of spousal support in Quebec was made
clear in the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the subject. In
the context of a constitutional challenge to Quebec's exclusion of unmarried spouses from the province's support regime, a number of justices
weighed in on the functions and objectives of spousal support, as they
are understood in Quebec7 9. Justice Deschamps' reasoning, on behalf of
one third of the Court, was particularly revealing, as her understanding
of the Quebec support obligation reads as a significant departure from
the compensatory model of spousal support established decades earlier
and never overruled: "[the] Civil Code of Qutbec [...] establishes that the
right to support granted to persons in need who are part of the family unit
is distinct in that it does not have a compensatory function ' ". For some
members of the Court, then, it is the provisions concerning property division that address the need to protect vulnerable spouses as well as the need
"to compensate for contributions made by the parties while living together
and to recognize the economic union formed by married and civil union
spouses"". At the federal level, these purposes are typically understood

75.

See e.g. Mireille D. CASTELLI and Dominique GOUBAU, Le droit de lafamille au Quebec,
5 th

ed., Quebec, Presses de l'Universite Laval, 2005, p. 365.

76.
77.

See especially J.D. c. S.A., supra,note 73; Droit de lafamille 1221, supra, note 73.
See e.g. L.S. v. A.C., 2006 QCCA 888; Droit de lafamille 172259, 2017 QCCA 1495
(note, however, that while the Court of Appeal invokes the language of compensation,
its analysis on spousal support rests heavily on the spouses' needs and means at the
time of separation).
78. See e.g. Droit de lafamille 1221, supra, note 73; Droit de lafamille 113904, 2011
QCCA 2269.
79. Quebec (Attorney General)v. A, supra,note 17.
80. Id., par. 383, Deschamps J., dissenting in part.
81. Id. Note that there are mixed views about the distinct functions of spousal support and
property division. See R. LECKEY, supra, note 73, p. 258-264.
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as the objectives of spousal support and form the basis for the formulas
contained in the Advisory Guidelines8 2 . For Deschamps J. and concurring
justices, however, spousal support in Quebec is, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, non-compensatory in nature83.
Justice Deschamps' statements reflect the deep theoretical disparity
between understandings of the function of spousal support in Quebec's
civil law tradition and the approach adopted in the rest of Canada. Spousal
support in Quebec is "focused on the basic needs of the vulnerable spouse"
and is based, among other things, on "the satisfaction of needs resulting
from the breakdown of a relationship of interdependence 84 ". Likewise,
the Quebec Court of Appeal has continued to hold that compensatory
principles do not factor into a spousal support determination where a
claimant spouse fails to demonstrate that she has made efforts to attain
self-sufficiency, typically by re-entering the workforce, even where she
spent the bulk of her employable years as a full-time homemaker85 . Further
in Droit de lafamille-1221,Justice Rochon characterized "l'id6e civiliste
de la cr6ance alimentaire" as depending, "en tout temps des ressources du
d6biteur et des besoins du cr6ancier 6". In Quebec, then, the granting of
spousal support is generally premised on need resulting from the demonstrated failure to achieve self-sufficiency, either in actual fact or based on
the claimant's remote prospects for employment, as evaluated by the judge.
2.3

Privileging Autonomy and Imputing Individual Choice

Quebec family law scholars commonly suggest that with regard to
matrimonial property and support obligations upon marital breakdown, the
law privileges personal autonomy and individual choice. In the academic
discourse surrounding Quebec matrimonial law, much ink has been spilled
around the concepts of "freedom of choice", contractual freedom, and

82.

See Moge v. Moge, supra, note 32; Bracklow v. Bracklow, supra, note 65; Advisory
Guidelines, supra, note 1, p. 6-9.

83.

Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, supra, note 17, par. 390.

84. Id., par. 392 and 396.
85. See Droit de lafamille 1221, supra, note 73. More recently, in Droit de lafamille
14175, supra,note 46, the Quebec Court of Appeal, relying on compensatory principles,
overturned a trial decision denying spousal support following a two-year marriage
where the wife worked within the home and raised five children. Even here, however,
the decision appears based on the premise that compensatory principles should only
be considered once a claimant spouse's efforts to achieve financial autonomy have been
sufficiently demonstrated.
86. Droit de lafamille 1221, supra, note 73, par. 69.
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individual autonomy 7 . In their decision confirming the constitutionality of
precluding unmarried spouses from claiming spousal support in Quebec,
several justices of the Supreme Court of Canada emphasized the value of
choice, both at the legislative and cultural levels 8 . The privileging of choice
is understood as promoting the family law principle of gender equality
between husbands and wives, which is deeply engrained in Quebec's social
fabric 9 . In its 2015 report on the future of Quebec family law, the consultative committee commissioned by the provincial government to make
recommendations for reform relied on this notion as one of its guiding
principles, referring to the couple as "un espace d'autonomie de la volont6
et de libert6 contractuelle 9°". Its recommendations were accordingly geared
toward promoting the cultural and legislative values of autonomy and
freedom in conjugal and family matters 91.
The vision of spousal support set out above-that is, as a measure
to respond to demonstrated need and promote economic independencealigns with the privileging of individual autonomy and choice. For some
judges, the absence of proven efforts to achieve financial autonomy is interpreted as the absence of demonstrated need. Moreover, in situations that
would give rise to a compensatory claim outside of Quebec-after a long
marriage during which the wife sacrificed income generating opportunities

87.

88.

89.
90.

91.

See e.g. Danielle BURMAN, "Politiques legislatives quebecoises dans lamnagement
des rapports pecuniaires entre epoux: d'une justice bien pensee A un semblant de
justice - un juste sujet de s'alarmer", (1988) 22 R.J.T. 149; Alain Roy, "Le contrat de
mariage en droit quebecois: un destin marque du sceau du paradoxe", (2006) 51 McGill
L.J. 665; Louise LANGEVIN, "Libert& de choix et protection juridique des conjoints de
fait
en cas de rupture: difficile exercice de jonglerie", (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 697; Benoi
MOORE, "Culture et droit de la famille: de l'institution A l'autonomie individuelle", (2009)
54 McGill L.J. 257; Louise LANGEVIN, "Liberte contractuelle et relations conjugales:
font-elles bon menage?", Nouvelles questions fiministes, vol. 28, n' 2, 2009, p. 24.
See Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, supra, note 17.
See e.g. H. BELLEAU and P. CORNUT ST-PIERRE, supra, note 70.
Comit4 consultatif supra,note 55, p. 58. Itis worth noting that not all members of the
committee were of the same view with respect to alimentary obligations. In dissenting
reasons, Professor Dominique Goubau noted that policies based on individual choice
and contractual freedom would ignore the demonstrated and ongoing economic impacts,
typically on women, of childrearing. See Comit4 consultatif supra, note 55, Annexe
VIII. The privileging of free choice and autonomy nevertheless represented the view of
the majority. Moreover, as mentioned above, none of the committee's recommendations
have been implemented. Nevertheless, that a government-appointed committee made
up of leading family law scholars, practitioners, and policy-makers placed principles
of free choice and independence at the centre of Quebec family law is indicative of the
significance of those views, at least among a critical mass of family law experts.
Id., p. 59.
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in favour of domestic responsibilities, for example-demonstrated financial
independence may bar the granting of support 92 .
In placing significant weight on the pursuit of financial independence,
Quebec judges seem to suggest that as autonomous individuals, spouses
should take individual responsibility for their decisions during and after
the marriage and accordingly bear the consequences 93 . The choice, for
example, to sacrifice professional opportunities in order to devote time
to domestic endeavours may give rise to a compensatory claim, but it
will be viewed as a deliberate decision made by an autonomous and independent actor, who must make subsequent efforts to mitigate the consequences of her choice. The evaluation of that claim will be coloured by
that choice and by the reasonableness of efforts aimed at achieving selfsufficiency. Demonstrated need, in other words, may be viewed as a result
of the spouses' express choices about the division of domestic labour.
Thus, it is possible to view some Quebec judges as envisioning a form of
implied contract between the spouses and a consequent assumption of the
associated costs 94.
Such an understanding of spousal support is not completely at odds
with the primacy of gender equality and autonomy in Quebec law. Formal
equality and individualism, as foundational principles of law, are indeed
reflected throughout the Civil Code. For example, spouses are presumed
to contribute equally toward the "expenses of the marriage in proportion
to their respective means 95' . That spouses also keep their legal surnames
upon marriage further promotes the ideals of individualism and personal
92.

See e.g. K.F.S. c. J.C., [2002] J.Q. No 6234,[2003] R.D.F. 59; J.D. c. S.A., supra, note 73;
ST. c. R.C., [2003] J.Q. No 838, [2003] R.D.E 357; Droit de lafamille

93.

113904, supra,

note 78; Droit de lefamille 111449, 2011 QCCS 2518. See also J.E.C. BRIERLEY and
R.A. MACDONALD, supra, note 63 ("If the achievement of autonomy is one important
goal for support awards, alimentary support may be expected to terminate as soon as
a former spouses has achieved that autonomy", p. 264).
This interpretation may not always reflect the reasoning of the Court of Appeal. See e.g.
L.S. v. A.C,supra, note 77, where the Court of Appeal eschewed the straightforward
attribution of choice to a wife's diminished financial position following family
breakdown, and Droit de lafamille 14175, supra, note 46, endorsing the compensatory
function of spousal support. The views described here, rather, emanate primarily
from trial decisions. As the majority of spousal support decisions are not reviewed by
the Court of Appeal, the reasoning of trial judges might be understood as reflecting
common views.

94.
95.

See J. DEWAR, supra, note 49 (on the relationship between the contract model and
individualism, at page 428).
Civil Code of Quibec, supra, note 60, art. 396. Note the second paragraph of this article,
which states: "The spouses may make their respective contributions by their activities
within the home". The implication that in performing unremunerated work in the home,
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autonomy 96. Moreover, the centrality of choice is what recently drove a
majority of the Supreme Court to uphold Quebec's legislative exclusion
of cohabiting spouses from the Civil Code's protective matrimonial law
regime 97 . But Quebec's distinctive understandings of support, as premised
on the cessation of the solidarity of marriage, the needs and means of the
spouses upon divorce, and the primacy of individual choice, are at odds
with the conception of marriage as ongoing partnership and relationship of
economic interdependence, which does not immediately end upon a judgment in divorce-that is, the conception on which the Advisory Guidelines
are based. Moreover, as the remainder of this article suggests, judicial
ambivalence toward the Advisory Guidelines based on the idea that they
do not reflect Quebec's approach to spousal support may not withstand
close scrutiny. That disconnect may stem from the fact that the approach of
some judges does not reflect the legislative context, at either the provincial
or federal levels.
3

Autonomy, Protection, and the Role of Choice in Quebec Family Law

Quebec judges appear to approach spousal support determinations
from two different perspectives. The "needs and means" model of support,
where the debtor spouse is responsible for ensuring that the claimant is able
to meet her basic needs, is rooted in the idea that with the termination of
the matrimonial bond, the economic solidarity of the spouses also ceases.
The "imputed contract" model of support, described above, is premised
on the idea that as independent and autonomous individuals, released
from matrimonial solidarity, spouses should take responsibility for their
individual choices during the marriage and bear the economic costs of
those choices upon marriage breakdown. Neither of these approaches
corresponds with the compensatory principle of spousal support and the
theory of support as a means of recognizing and redressing the economic
impacts of the interdependence that develops as the spouses' economic
lives merge over time. These latter principles have been endorsed by the
Supreme Court in its leading decisions on spousal support, and it is on
these same principles that the Advisory Guidelines are based99 . Thus,
even though Quebec is bound by the federal Divorce Act, the province's

96.
97.
98.
99.

for the sake of the family, spouses are simply fulfilling their marital obligations, might
help explain some judges' reticence to award compensation for that work when the
marriage ends.
See B. MOORE, supra,note 87, 265; Civil Code of Quebec, supra,note 60, art. 393.
Quebec (Attorney General)v. A, supra, note 17.
See Moge v. Moge, supra,note 32; Bracklow v. Bracklow, supra, note 65.
Advisory Guidelines, supra, note 1, p. 6-9.
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approach to spousal support is disconnected from the legislative and judicial interpretations applied in the rest of the countryl °° .
The concepts of freedom of choice, contractual freedom, and individual autonomy loom large in the discourse around Quebec matrimonial
law. This Part maintains, however, that the invocation of choice and individualism as the theoretical foundations for spousal support is, at the level
of provincial law, flawed. Quebec matrimonial law does not privilege free
choice. Rather, married spouses in Quebec have little choice with respect
to the organization of their economic lives, and no choice with respect
to the property that composes the family patrimony, explained below.
The limited period of freedom of choice between spouses ended when
it became clear that freedom of choice was harmful to women. Moreover, under early Quebec law, marriage could not be characterized by
the concept of pure freedom of contract. To rely on principles of choice
to describe the matrimonial relationship is not only misleading, but also
inaccurate. The Quebec approach, when judges emphasize individualism
and the promotion of self-sufficiency, fails to recognize that the legislative
framework surrounding family breakdown aims to remedy the documented
economic disadvantages to women that result from privileging free choice.
Insofar as resistance to the Advisory Guidelines is anchored in these principles, the judicial approach is out of step with provincial law.
3.1

The Community Regime and the Immutability
of the Marriage Contract

The significance of choice in matrimonial relations dates back to the
Civil Code of Lower Canada.Heavily influenced by the law of France,
Quebec law gave spouses a choice, upon marriage, between two matrimonial
regimes: community of property and separation as to property 0 1. Under
the former, all of the spouses' property was held communally between the
spouses and administered by the husband. In the case of marital breakdown or dissolution, the community was shared equally between them.

100. Again, it is important to note that this critique applies primarily to trial decisions; the
Court of Appeal, for its part, has shown much more openness to the compensatory
principles enshrined in the federal legislation.
101. See J. PINEAU and M. PRATTE, supra, note 66 (defining a matrimonial regime as "un
ensemble complet de regles gouvernant les rapports exclusivement pecuniaires des
epoux et donnant un statut particulier Aleurs biens, dans leurs relations mutuelles ainsi
qu'A l'gard des tiers", p. 205). Note that in theory, Quebec spouses were free to choose
any regime or means of organizing their economic lives, beyond the two listed here.
As the default, however, the community regime was most common, with separation of
property the most likely alternative.
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Spouses married under the separation as to property regime did not share
in a community of property. Each spouse was responsible for his or her
own assets; upon dissolution, property remained in the hands of its original
owner or of the spouse that had accumulated it during the marriage 10 2.
Thus, by enabling spouses to select their regime, the first laws of Quebec
accommodated choice and individual freedom in matrimonial law.
It would be a mistake, however, to exaggerate the role of free choice
in 1866. While spouses were free to select their regime, the majority of
couples did not contract out of the default regime, either because they were
unaware of the alternatives, or because, immediately prior to the marriage,
they were simply not concerned with arrangements respecting property
and finances0 3 . Moreover, it is important to note that the default regime
was not considered a contract. Rather, it was a unique product of Quebec's
civil law, in the absence of a marriage contract 10 4. Founded on a presumption, and not on the spouses' intentions, the community of property was
"not precisely equatable to common law contract, partnership, or tenancy
in common 10 5". It is accordingly inaccurate to describe Quebec marriage,
in 1866, as primarily characterized by choice or contractual freedom.
Further to the fact that most couples did not, by contract, select an
alternative matrimonial regime, Quebec marriage under the Civil Code of
Lower Canada,like the French model of marriage from which it evolved, was
affected by the principle of immutability of matrimonial regimes. Spouses,
despite mutual agreement, were prohibited from changing matrimonial
regimes 10 6. Envisioned as "un pacte de famille", immutability protected
spouses from being dispossessed of personal wealth once the marriage
was celebrated10 7 . The little choice that existed-to opt for a matrimonial
contract or another regime such as the separation of property-was therefore removed once the marriage was celebrated. Further, the default regime
at the time-community of property-saw the husband as administrator
of the community, with the responsibility of diligent administration, so
as to protect his wife's economic interests 08 . Thus marriage and family
102. See Jean PINEAU and Danielle BURMAN, Effets du mariage et regimes matrimoniaux,
Montreal, Themis, 1984, p. 12.
103. UNITED NATIONS, Legal Status ofMarried Women. ReportsSubmitted by the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. ST/SOA/35 (1958), p. 48. See also id. (in 1958, approximately
75 percent of married couples remained in the default community, p. 122).
104. Harold MARGLES, "The New Canadian Couple: Civil Law Matrimonial Property and
itsEffects in Ontario", (1958) 16 Fac. L. Rev. 53, 53.
105. Id.
106. UNITED NATIONS, supra, note 103, p. 49.
107. J.PINEAU and M. PRATTE, supra, note 66, p. 187.

108. Id., p. 189.
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life were characterized by "marital and paternal authority, dependence
and obedience of the wife, and insolubility of marriage10 9". Rather than
uphold principles of free choice and individualism, Quebec matrimonial
law of 1866, much as it is today, was characterized by paternalism and the
protection of women's economic fates u ° .
3.2

Freedom of Choice and its Consequences for Women

The second half of the twentieth century saw the original paternalism
and protectionism of Quebec family law diminish, as the years between the
1960's and 1970's were marked by the emancipation of Quebec's married
women. Formal equality was enshrined; the community regime was modified to enable the joint administration of communal property1 1 , and a new
default regime enabled spouses to alter their regime during the marriage
and limited the default community of property to property accumulated
during the marriage11 2. Spouses were now able to choose how to organize
their financial affairs, through the vehicle of the matrimonial regime11 3.
Despite the increased economic powers of women within the family,
many Quebec families opted out of the default regime, choosing instead to
remain separate as to property 4 . Women, despite typically not working
outside the home or accumulating personal wealth, often agreed to contract

109. C. L'HEUREUX-DUBE, supra, note 66, 1584.
110. See Jean-Maurice BRISSON and Nicholas KASIRER, "The Married Woman in Ascendance,
the Mother Country in Retreat: from Legal Colonialism to Legal Nationalism in Quebec
Matrimonial Law Reform, 1866-1991", (1995) 23 Man. L.J. 406 ("The law consolidated
in the Civil Code of Lower Canada in 1866 had spousal inequality as a defining
feature- lespouvoirs au mari, said a maxim inherited from old French law, laprotection
a lafemme", 406). See also R. LECKEY, supra, note 56, chap. 2.
111. Act respecting the legal capacity of married women, S.Q. 1964, c. 66 (under which
administration of communal property no longer fell exclusively to the husband).
112. Act respecting matrimonial regimes, S.Q. 1969, c. 77. In 1969, in response to the
frequency with which spouses opted out of the default community of property regime,
the Quebec legislature changed the default matrimonial regime to the "partnership of
acquests". The partnership enables each spouse to maintain control over his or her
personal assets during the marriage, regardless of whether the assets were acquired
before or during the marriage. Upon the breakdown of the marriage, however, certain
types of property accumulated during the marriage - specifically, income and fruits
of other property - are deemed assets, and are consequently shared equally between
the spouses. See Civil Code of Quebec, supra, note 60, art. 448-484.
113. J. PINEAU and M. PRATTE, supra, note 66, p. 11. For another thorough review of the
legal emancipation of married women, see J.-M. BRISSON and N. KASIRER, supra,
note 110.
114. Roger COMTOIS, "Pourquoi la societ& d'acquts?", (1967) 27 R. du B. 602.
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out of the community of property (or partnership of acquests 115). By 1967,
upwards of 70 per cent of couples were using marriage contracts to choose
to be separate as to property 116 . Spouses were attracted to the simplicity of
the regime and, in many cases, were simply ignorant of the consequences of
choosing to remain separate as to property 117. More significantly, however,
among women's motives for choosing separation, was the fact that the
community of property, despite women's emancipation, did not give wives
the autonomy, capacity, and powers they wished to exercise over their
property, and that the community of property necessarily entailed a
community of debts118 . The preference for separation was thus understood
as a reaction, on the part of married women, to the historically patriarchal
nature of the community of property regime, which was seen as incompatible with the legal emancipation of women, and as a means of protecting
themselves from the risks associated with a declaration of bankruptcy on
the part of their husbands1 19. In other words, separation was perceived as a
long awaited guarantee of married women's personal autonomy, in line with
the cultural primacy of freedom of choice and individualism 120 . Moreover,
the ability to choose one's matrimonial regime-before and during the
marriage-meant that the principles of freedom of choice and contract
were indeed now central to Quebec matrimonial law 121.
As rates of separation, and eventually divorce, increased, it became
apparent that privileging choice would have serious, and negative, economic
impacts on women. Upon divorce, women who did not accumulate personal
wealth were left with nothing. Indeed, the separate as to property regime
was "fatal" to these women 122; a woman who had no property upon marriage
and who during the marriage devoted her time to unpaid domestic labour,
had, at the end of the marriage, no claim to share in her husband's wealth,
to which she contributed by alleviating him of domestic responsibilities 123.
For the Civil Code Revision Office, charged with reforming the province's
matrimonial law at the time, these situations had the potential to result in

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id., 604.
Id.
Id., 611.
Id.
See D. BURMAN, supra, note 87, 151.
Id.

121. See J. PINEAU and M. PRATTE, supra, note 66, p. 186. See also J.-M. BRISSON and

N. KASIRER, supra, note 110 (on the connection between the removal of the principle of
immutability of the matrimonial regime and the extension of freedom of contract, 429).
122. See D. BURMAN, supra, note 87, 152.
123. Id.
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"real injustice" to Quebec women 124 . Indeed, easier access to divorce under
the new federal Divorce Act, adopted in 1968125, meant that the potential
for "devastating consequences" for non-working wives resulting from the
choice of matrimonial regime was realized 126 . For many women, then,
freedom of contract, in addition to establishing their autonomy, contributed
to their poverty1 27 . Freedom of choice, as animating theme of Quebec
matrimonial law, was problematic for a large proportion of the province's
population and was thus short lived.
3.3

Scaling Back Choice: The Compensatory Allowance

In the 1980's, legislative reform in response to its harmful financial
effects on women began to chip away at the central value of freedom of
choice. By adopting the compensatory allowance, the legislature sought to
remedy a spouse's-typically a wife's-inability to share in the enrichment
that she contributed to her husband's patrimony 128 . The remedy provides
for the possibility of compensation for a spouse who has enriched her
husband's patrimony, or pecuniary interests, by her contribution in the
form of unpaid goods or services 129. Inspired by the common law constructive trust and rooted in the civilian concept of unjust enrichment 130 , the
compensatory allowance was created in the context of the "great many
flagrant injustices" that resulted from a regime characterized by freedom
of matrimonial agreements 131. It was "clearly intended to mitigate the injustices produced by the implementation of a freely adopted matrimonial
regime 132"' .
As a remedy to the courts' consistent refusal to set aside marriage
contracts and the choices contained in them, the adoption of the compensatory allowance was one of the first steps toward mitigating the consequences

124.

QUEBEC, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, Report on Matrimonial

Regimes, vol. 5,Montreal, 1968, p. 9.
125. Divorce Act, supra, note 16.

126. Quebec (Attorney General)v. A, supra,note 17, par. 61, LeBel J. For a discussion of the
huge increase in divorce rates in Quebec following the adoption of the 1968 DivorceAct,
see Constance BACKHOUSE, Claire L'Heureux-Dubi. A Life, Vancouver, UBC Press,
2017, p. 182.
127. J.-M. BRISSON and N. KASIRER, supra, note 110, 436.
128. J. PINEAU and M. PRATTE, supra, note 66, p. 89.

129. Civil Code of Quebec, supra, note 60, art. 427.
130. See Ernest CAPARROS, "Le regime primaire dans le nouveau Code civil du Quebec:
quelques remarques critiques", (1981) 22 C. de D. 325, 334.
131. Lacroix v. Valois, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1259, 74 D.L.R. (4th) 61, at 1275 and 1276.
132. Id. See also Ernest CAPARROS, "Les regimes matrimoniaux secondaires Ala lumiere du
nouveau Code civil du Quebec", (1982) 13 R.G.D. 27.
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of the freedom of choice that once characterized Quebec matrimonial
law. Anchored in the objective of genuine economic equality between the
spouses, the mechanism threatened to undermine the freedom of choice
inherent in the marriage contract 133. Faced with the impoverishment of
many women married under the regime of separation, the compensatory
allowance saw the legislature subordinate choice "to the agenda of protection 134 ' . The compensatory allowance meant that spouses could no longer
absolutely preclude any intermingling of their respective property, thus
paving the way for the progressive disappearance of freedom of choice
among married spouses.
In the contest between choice and protectionism, the compensatory
allowance became a casualty of narrow judicial interpretations in favour
of free choice. Courts, citing the cultural values of contractual autonomy
and financial independence, interpreted the relevant provisions restrictively, requiring women to demonstrate a contribution over and above the
typical marital division of labour, such as unpaid work for her husband's
business, as well as a causal relationship between the contribution and the
enrichment 135. Further, the compensatory allowance was to be interpreted
in the context of codified matrimonial law, in which the legislator had
made an express policy choice to allow spouses to select their regime 136.
To award a compensatory allowance for domestic work, freely consented
to by the parties, would have constituted a disguised sharing of property
and a disregard for contractual freedom 137.
The judicial unwillingness to "run roughshod over the marriage
contract and the chosen matrimonial regime" meant that the compensatory allowance would not be sufficient to alleviate the economic injustices that resulted from the legislative and social entrenchment of freedom
of choice1 38 . Thus, formal equality between spouses, manifested in the
privileging of free choice, prevailed, while the principle of substantive
equality, expressed through protectionist measures aimed at ensuring that
the economic consequences of divorce were shared equally between the

133. J.-M. BRISSON and N. KASIRER, supra, note 110, 435.
134. Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, supra, note 17, par. 307, Abella J.
135. See Droit de lafamille 67, [1985] C.A. 135. See also Droit de lafamille 391, [1987]
R.J.Q. 1998, [1987] R.D.F. 523, cited in A. Roy, supra, note 87.
136. See Droit de lafamille 67, supra, note 135.
137. Id. See also Lacroix v. Valois, supra, note 131, at 1279 discussing the close relationship
between the compensatory allowance and the action in unjust enrichment, and the
consequent applicability of similar narrow rules.
138. J.-M. BRISSON and N. KASIRER, supra, note 110, 435.
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spouses, "suffered at the hands of contractual freedom 139". The Quebec
legislator went back to the drawing board.
3.4

The Final Erosion of Choice: The Family Patrimony

The ultimate demise of freedom of matrimonial choice came in the
form of the 1989 enactment of the family patrimony. Adopted in response
to the demonstrated judicial restraint in interpreting the compensatory
allowance 140 , the family patrimony is a mandatory primary regime-that
is, the provisions governing the family patrimony apply obligatorily to all
marriages, regardless of whether the spouses opt for a regime of separation or the default matrimonial regime of the partnership of acquests 141.
The family patrimony provisions dictate that, upon the dissolution of the
marriage, both spouses share equally in the value of certain property,
regardless of ownership and matrimonial regime 142. Of public order 143,
spouses may not contract out of the family patrimony, which includes
"the residences of the family [...] the movable property with which they
are furnished or decorated and which serves for the use of the household,
the motor vehicles used for family travel and the benefits accrued during
the marriage under a retirement plan 144 ' . The regime does not encompass
all of a couple's property; spouses may still choose to be separate as to
property with respect to their remaining assets. But the adoption of the
family patrimony nevertheless had a serious impact on the law of marriage.
As a practical matter, most of a family's wealth will lie in the matrimonial
home and any secondary residences, their furnishings, any vehicles, and
the spouses' retirement savings plans. Save for its impact on the very
wealthy, then, the obligatory family patrimony regime effectively overrides
the chosen matrimonial regime 145.
The measure's primary objective-the reduction of economic inequalities between spouses married under the separation of property regime
(but nevertheless applicable to all married spouses)-was clear from the
name of the amending bill. But in addition to promoting fair outcomes, the
Act to amend the Civil Code of Qutbec and other legislation in order to

139. Id.
140. L. LANGEVIN, "Libert& de choix et protection juridique des conjoints de fait en cas de
rupture: difficile exercice de jonglerie", supra, note 87, 714.
141. See J. PINEAU and M. PRATTE, supra, note 66, p. 199.
142. See MT. v. J.-YT., 2008 SCC 50, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 781.
143. Civil Code of Quebec, supra, note 60, art. 391.
144. Id., art. 414 and 415.
145. 1 PINEAU and M. PRATTE, supra, note 66, p. 199 and 206. See also G.B. c. C.C., [2001]
R.J.Q. 1435, [2001] R.D.F. 435.
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favour economic equality between spouses effectively deprived Quebec
couples of the hard won freedom of choice that had come to characterize
the law 14 6 . Thus, the adoption of the family patrimony symbolized the end
of an era in Quebec matrimonial law 147 , during which freedom of choice
was given more weight than fairness and the value of women's domestic
contributions went unrecognized. In a few short decades, the law went
from robustly protecting spouses' contractual freedom and economic independence, to creating a "carcan juridique 148 ' based primarily on principles
of protectionism 149.
For most married couples in Quebec, freedom of choice is a now
relic of earlier times. As suggested above, however, where spousal support
is concerned, the legislative removal of choice does not seem to have
diminished the importance of the concept in the judicial mindset. Rather,
while matrimonial laws were adapted in response to social facts about
the economic consequences of divorce on women, judicial attitudes about
support, as reflected in the discretionary awarding of support, still appear
to focus on the outdated principles of choice and autonomy and are therefore out of step with the legislative context within which spousal support
determinations are made. Insofar as it informs some Quebec judges' rejection of the Advisory Guidelines,the ethic of choice and individualism does
not correspond with the policy choices enshrined in the province's positive
law. Rather, the decision to subject all spouses to a mandatory primary
regime, aimed at securing substantive equality for spouses, recognized that
formal equality, in the form of economic freedom for spouses, "represented
a potentially de-stabilising force in married life" and "held no guarantee
for the economically vulnerable partner150 ' . Thus, spousal autonomy had
to give way to the promotion of substantive equalityl 5l.
146. Act to amend the Civil Code of Quebec and other legislation in order to favour
economic equality between spouses, S.Q. 1989, c. 55, art 8.

147. But see Nicholas KASIRER, "Testing the Origins of the Family Patrimony in Everyday
Law", (1995) 36 C. de D. 795 (suggesting that rather than a new legislative creation, the
family patrimony can be understood as rooted in existing "customary norms already
present in the Quebec legal order at the time of its enactment", 798).
148. D. BURMAN, supra, note 87, 154.

149. Dominique GOUBAU, "La conjugalite en droit prive: comment concilier 'autonomie' et
'protection'?", in Pierre-Claude LAFOND and Brigitte LEFEBVRE (eds.), L'union civile.
e

Nouveaux modeles de conjugalit4et deparentalit au 21 siecle, Cowansville, E ditions

Yvon Blais, 2003, p. 153, at page 157. See also Quebec (Attorney General)v. A, supra,
note 17, par. 307, Abella J.
150. J.-M. BRISSON and N. KASIRER, supra,note 110, 432 (referring to the protections of the
family residence, not canvassed here, but also applicable to other mechanisms aimed
at protecting the economic well-being of vulnerable spouses).
151. Id.
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The progressive development of a paternalistic matrimonial law geared
primarily toward economic protectionism suggests that Quebec judges'
appeal to principles of contract and individualism involves an exaggeration of the importance of choice in Quebec law, both today and historically. While more room for choice existed under the Civil Code of Lower
Canada, the immutability of matrimonial regimes nevertheless limited
spouses' economic freedom once married. Later legislative amendments,
including the adoption of the compensatory allowance and the family patrimony, limited choice even further. It is therefore a mistake for trial judges
to emphasize-expressly or implicitly through their reasoning-the role of
choice as central organizing principle when, in truth, the importance and
desirability of freedom of contract in marriage was a perpetual subject
of debate and disagreement 152 . Examining the legislative developments
in hindsight, it becomes clear that choice has taken a back seat: "Quebec
explicitly subordinated a contractual theory of support to a protective
one based on mutual obligation, since its law does not allow a couple in a
formally recognized union to contract out of the Civil Code's mandatory
support provision 153" '. Moreover, while some degree of choice subsisted
until the adoption of the family patrimony in 1989, today's matrimonial
law is better characterized as concerned with conjugality, family solidarity,
and protecting family members from economic vulnerability, and not with
the fiction of free will 154.
Quebec judges' distinct approach to the economics of marital breakdown does not seem to correspond with the province's legislative reality.
Judicial reasoning rooted in freedom of choice and individualism may have
some cultural resonance 155, but it has little connection with the legislative
landscape of Quebec matrimonial law historically, or today. Accordingly,
the idea that the principles enshrined in the Advisory Guidelinesprinciples of economic partnership and compensation for lost earning
capacity-should be rejected in favour of an approach to spousal support
grounded in choice and imputed contract is not only paradoxical, but is
harmful to women, whom the law otherwise seeks to protect. Further, as
152. Id., 429.
153. Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, supra, note 17, par. 295, Abella J. In addition to the
constraints imposed by the family patrimony, Quebec spouses may not, in advance
of marriage dissolution, renounce the right to claim spousal support. See Quebec
(Procureure ginirale) c. B.T., 2005 QCCA 748. See also R. LECKEY, supra,note 73 (on
the "obligatory character of major elements of [Quebec] marriage law", 255).
154. See Benoi MOORE, "La cons6cration de l'autonomie individuelle", Bulletin de Liaison.
Federationdes Associations de Families Monoparentales et Recomposies du Quebec,

vol. 40, n' 1, 2015, p. 6.
155. See e.g. Comit4 consultatif supra, note 55.
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the following Part suggests, the idea that some Quebec judges' reasoning
might instead be anchored in the relevant federal law are equally unpersuasive, as Supreme Court judges interpreting the DivorceAct have explicitly
distanced themselves from the individualism that once characterized the
prevailing approach to spousal support. Rather than viewing spouses as
economically independent individuals, the provisions of the Divorce Act
are to be interpreted in a context that recognizes the economic interdependence that typically characterizes the marriage relationship.
4

Departing from Federal Law in the Courts and the Literature

Perhaps in an effort to preserve provincial autonomy over private
family matters, some Quebec judges have failed to adapt their reasoning
to correspond with judicial interpretations of the Divorce Act 156. In doing
so, their approach fails to grasp the reality of most marriage relationships, where spouses are typically bound by a degree of economic interdependence so that their financial lives cannot be easily or neatly severed
upon marriage breakdown. Instead, the case law appears to be grounded
not only in beliefs about the role of free choice in Quebec matrimonial
law, but also in the privileging of self-sufficiency inherent in the "needs
and means" model of support, described above. This might explain the
consistent resistance to the Advisory Guidelines,rooted as they are in the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the binding provisions of the Divorce
Act, which have been interpreted so as to accommodate and reflect the
reality of interdependence in marriage. Further, resistance to the Advisory
Guidelines in Quebec has been attributed to their emphasis on the length
of the marriage in calculating support. Scholarship from Quebec reflects
similar attitudes toward the Advisory Guidelines, and supports the idea
that they should not apply, given the province's unique matrimonial law.
This final Part suggests that neither the jurisprudence nor the scholarship
withstands meaningful scrutiny when read in light of the applicable federal
law on spousal support.
While Quebec judges emphasize the pursuit of self-sufficiency on the
part of former spouses, judicial interpretations of the Divorce Act have
been unequivocal that the goal of spousal support is to recognize and
to provide redress for the economic harms that typically result from the
marriage relationship-a relationship often characterized by the merger of
the spouses' economic lives and the resulting financial interdependence. To
this end, the Supreme Court of Canada has set out two competing models
of spousal support. First, according to the compensatory model, spousal
156. See cases referred to in supra, notes 73, 76, and 78, and accompanying text.
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support functions to financially compensate dependent spouses for their
unremunerated contributions to the family 157 . Thus, spousal support seeks
to remedy the professional and economic disadvantages associated with
the prioritization of domestic tasks and to recognize the economic benefits
to the spouse whose earning potential and long-term economic prospects
have flourished, in part due to the claimant spouse's contributions. Second,
spousal support, in its non-compensatory form, is grounded in the "basic
social obligation" that characterizes marriage, "in which primary responsibility falls on the former spouse to provide for his or her ex-partner,
rather than on the government1 58 ". Thus, spousal support recognizes the
"interdependence that marriage creates 159" and responds to the idea that
spouses' financial (and social) lives necessarily merge over time, and that
financial intermingling, or "merger over time", cannot be easily unraveled
at marriage dissolution 160 . Accordingly, spousal support, under the interdependency model, functions to replace lost income that the claimant spouse
enjoyed as an economic partner in marriage 161.
One key reason that awards might be lower in Quebec than pursuant to
the Advisory Guidelines is the different ways that courts interpret a former
spouse's need in the context of non-compensatory support. In setting out
the compensatory model of support in Moge, the Supreme Court indicated
that awards might also be warranted in non-compensatory situations-that
is, based on a former spouse's need alone1 62 . But the question of how to
understand the concept of need went unanswered: should need "be understood in relation to basic, subsistence needs or more contextually in relation to the former standard of living? 163 ' Following Bracklow, a response
began to emerge, with need regularly measured in relation to the marital
standard of living1 64 . Indeed, such an interpretation aligns with the articulation, in Bracklow, of spousal support as income replacement, under the
mutual obligation, or independency model of marriage 165, as well as the

157.
158.
159.
160.

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

See Moge v. Moge, supra,note 32.
Bracklow v. Bracklow, supra, note 65, par. 23.
Id., par. 27.
See CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra, note 7, p. 28 (connecting the "merger
over time" approach to spousal support with the "interdependency" model described
in Bracklow); Advisory Guidelines, supra, note 1 ("Merger over Time and Existing
Theories of Spousal Support", p. 53).
Bracklow v. Bracklow, supra, note 65, par. 23.
See Julien D. PAYNE, "Spousal and Child Support After Moge, Willick and Levesque",
(1994-95) 12 Can. Fain. L.Q. 261, 267.
C. ROGERSON, supra, note 6, 195.
See id., 231, citing Keller v. Black, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 690 (ON S.C.).
See Bracklow v. Bracklow, supra, note 65, par. 27.
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more general idea that the spousal support obligation is rooted in "[j]ustice
and considerations of fairness 166" ' .
In Quebec, however, as seen above, the concept of need seems to
amount to something more basic than marital lifestyle. The Court of
Appeal has measured need with reference to what is required for a spouse
to "remplir ses obligations vis-A-vis la r6sidence et pouvoir 6galement payer
sa subsistance personnelle1 67"' . Thus the obligation of support in Quebec
is understood as providing enough to "combler les besoins de base des
membres d'une famille168"' , and seems to exclude things other than housing,
food, clothing, personal effects, and the like 169, while in other jurisdictions,
need is understood in terms of the marital standard of living, and spousal
support is understood as providing a period of adjustment for a dependent
spouse to adapt to a lower standard170 . Accordingly, by grounding spousal
support analyses exclusively in the Civil Code, some Quebec judges do
not take into account the development of the law interpreting the binding
federal legislation-the law that forms the theoretical foundation of the
Advisory Guidelines.
A principal critique of the Advisory Guidelines on the part of Quebec
trial judges is that they do not give equal weight to all of the statutory
objectives of spousal support, including the pursuit of self-sufficiency 171.
But privileging the pursuit of economic independence as the principal
objective of spousal support, ignores both the text and the Supreme Court's
interpretations of the Divorce Act, which lists four distinct objectives
of spousal support 172. Only one of these objectives-the promotion of
"economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period of
time"-contains qualifying language; a support order should promote selfsufficiency only "in so far as practicable 173 ' . Interpreting these objectives,
the Supreme Court has confirmed that no individual objective is to be given
priority. Rather, spousal support should "reflect the diverse dynamics of

166.
167.
168.
169.

Id., par. 48.
L.(T.) c. L.A.P., [2002] R.J.Q. 2627 (QC C.A.), par. 69.
Droit de lafamille 102866, 2010 QCCA 1978, par. 144.
See Droit de lafamille 13396, 2013 QCCA 317, par. 41.

170. See C. ROGERSON, supra, note 6, 237.

171. See D.S. c. M.S.C., supra, note 25.
172. Divorce Act, supra, note 2, art. 15.2 (6).
173. Id. The others are to:"(a) recognize any economic advantages or disadvantages to the
spouses arising from the marriage or its
breakdown; (b) apportion between the spouses
any financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage over and
above any obligation for the support of any child of the marriage; [and] (c) relieve any
economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage".
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many unique marital relationships 17 4' . At the same time, however, Justice
L'Heureux-Dub6, in the Supreme Court's leading decision on compensatory spousal support, emphasized that the objective of self-sufficiency is,
unlike the other objectives of support, "tempered by the caveat that it is
to be made a goal only 'in so far as practicable'1 75 ' . Thus, the Supreme
Court rejected the "ethos of deemed self-sufficiency" that some Quebec
judges privilege 176.
Moreover, the Court was express in its finding, based on the evidence
before it, that the self-sufficiency model of support has clearly disenfranchised women, both in the courtroom and beyond 177. Accordingly, a theory
that has contributed to the "feminization of poverty" and the "female
decline into poverty" could not have been Parliament's intention in setting
out the objectives of spousal support1 7 . By incorporating the principles of
compensation set out by the Court in Moge, the Advisory Guidelinesreflect
the Court's rebuff of self-sufficiency as a principal objective of support.
Indeed, they incorporate the idea that spousal support, in its compensatory form, is not a transitional measure aimed at seeing a claimant through
a difficult, but temporary, period of adjustment, but rather, is an "earned
entitlement", meant to compensate for the economic sacrifices inherent
in the unequal division of labour that typically characterizes marriage 179.
As seen, downplaying the compensatory objectives of spousal support
may align with the idea, entrenched in the Civil Code, that in carrying out
domestic work, spouses are simply fulfilling their role in marriage180 . But
where federal law is concerned, rejection of the Advisory Guidelinesbased
on the claim that they underemphasise the goal of self-sufficiency is not a
tenable interpretation of the applicable law.

174. Moge v. Moge, supra, note 32.
175. Id.

176. Id.
177. Id., 857.

178. Id., at 853 and 857. Justice L'Heureux-Dube found that in the years following the 1968
adoption of the Divorce Act, "the percentage of poor women found among all women in
this country more than doubled. During the same period the percentage of poor among
all men climbed by 24 percent".
179. C. ROGERSON, supra,note 6, 250. Itis worth noting that Quebec is not an exception to
the repeatedly demonstrated phenomenon of women's unequal assumption of domestic
tasks. See INSTITUT DE RECHERCHE ET D'INFORMATIONS SOCIO-ECONOMIQUES (IRIS),
"Taches domestiques: encore loin d'un partage 6quitable", 2014, [Online], [cdn.irisrecherche.qc.ca/uploads/publication/file/14- 01239 -IRIS -Notes-Taches -domestiques
WEB.pdf] (November 5th , 2018).
180. Civil Code of Quebec, supra, note 60, art. 396.
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This should be not understood as implying that there is no longer room
for considering the pursuit of self-sufficiency in awarding spousal support.
Moge did not have the effect of making the objective of self-sufficiency
irrelevant when determining awards8 1 . Rather, self-sufficiency, insofar
as it is practicable, is "only one consideration 182", and is not paramount
under the Divorce Act. Moreover, the interdependency model of support,
in line with Bracklow, does not relieve spousal support claimants outside of
Quebec from demonstrating any pursuit of self-sufficiency after marriage
breakdown. Indeed, Bracklow makes clear that "it is the duty of dependent
spouses to strive to free themselves from their dependencies and to assume
full self-sufficiency, thereby mitigating the need for continued compensation18 3". In Quebec, then, the difficulty is not simply that some judges privilege the objective of self-sufficiency, but rather, it is with the understanding
of when self-sufficiency has been attained. As with the question of need,
some Quebec judges will equate self-sufficiency with the ability to meet
basic needs18 4 . Further, in line with the underemphasis of compensation
for unpaid work in the home, a finding of self-sufficiency often signals
that the claimant is no longer entitled to support 85 ; in some cases, such
a finding will have the effect of denying a former spouse her earned entitlement, compensatory in nature, on the basis that self-sufficiency has
been attained and she is no longer in need. In others, the court might
seek evidence of efforts to attain self-sufficiency, privileging this objective
over that of compensation, even where it accepts that self-sufficiency can
be difficult to achieve after a long traditional marriage18 6 . This approach
confuses compensatory and needs-based support, and risks reviving the
idea, rejected in Moge, that the primary objective of spousal support is to
ensure a clean financial break between the spouses, instead of compensating losses and responding to interdependence.
In addition to their underemphasis of the objective of financial independence, Quebec judges have criticized the Advisory Guidelines for their

181.
182.
183.
184.

See S. ENGEL, supra, note 22, 404.
Id.
Bracklow v. Bracklow, supra, note 65, par. 29.
See e.g. F.(L.D.) c. M.(M.A.), 2000 CanLIl 11356 (QC C.A.) (for repeated references to
the claimant's ability to meet her "besoins essentiels" in evaluating her prospects for
achieving self-sufficiency). For the opposite view, see Droitde lafamille 2166, [1995]
R.J.Q. 999 (QC C.A.) ("notre Cour a maintenu cette tendance jurisprudentielle de ne
pas considerer l'independance economique atteinte par le seul fait de subvenir A des
besoins essentiels A caractre minimal", par. 67).
185. CANADA, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra, note 29, p. 97.
186. See e.g. R.T. c. H.B., 2004 CanLIl 40446 (QC C.S.).
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overemphasis on the length of the marriage in calculating support8 7 . This
critique, however, involves an over-simplification of the Advisory Guidelines and ignores the dictates of the Supreme Court. Indeed, in endorsing
the Advisory Guidelines as "un outil de travail bien fait, commode et
pratique l " ' , the Quebec Court of Appeal observed that the length of the
marriage reflects the principle of the "fusion au fil des ann6es" ("merger
over time") of spouses' economic lives-a concept endorsed in principle
by the Supreme Court in Moge, dealing with compensatory support, and
explicitly in Bracklow, referring to non-compensatory support8 9 . Drawing
on these decisions, Justice Bich wrote: "La repr6sentation du mariage
comme <<association socio-6conomique>> ressort assez nettement de [...]
la Loi sur le divorce. L'on peut raisonnablement penser en effet que plus
le mariage dure, plus l'association est 6troite et sa dissolution probl6matique1 90". As the length of a marriage increases, so too does the spouses'
economic interdependence, thus making the length of the marriage a
significant factor in determining support1 91. Moreover, there is nothing to
suggest that the same dynamic does not characterize marriage in Quebec1 92.
Some decisions resisting the application of the Advisory Guidelines
in Quebec also express particular concern about their effect of placing a
durational term on awards where there are no dependent children of the
marriage1 93 . As the Court of Appeal found in 2011, however, that awards
may be time limited aligns will with the relational concept of merger over
time and the idea that shorter marriages will result in lower levels of dependency1 94 . This dynamic too is not unique to marriages outside of Quebec,
and it corresponds with the idea, explained above, that need, pursuant to
the social obligation model of spousal support, might be interpreted so as
to ease a dependent spouse's transition to a new standard of living.
The rejection of the Advisory Guidelines by some Quebec trial judges
as rooted in the basic needs and means of the spouses, as that term is
understood pursuant to the Civil Code, and not on the economic partnership espoused in the Supreme Court's leading cases interpreting the
Divorce Act, is evident not only in the decisions of the Quebec Superior

See D.S. c. M.S.C., supra, note 25, par. 40.
DF 112606, supra, note 15, par. 104.
Id., par. 99.
Id., par. 100.
Id., par. 101.
See IRIS, supra, note 179.
See e.g. Droit de la famille 123274, supra, note 43, par. 49. Note that time-limited
support is not, however, exceptional. See e.g. J.D. c. S.A., supra, note 73.
194. DF 112606, supra, note 15, par. 101.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
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Court (and some of the Court of Appeal), but also, as highlighted above,
in the concurring reasons, in Quebec v. A, of one Quebec judge 195. The
understanding of spousal support based on meeting the basic needs of
the claimant spouse, however, ignores the economic merger that characterizes the marriage relationship. Instead, the needs and means model
of support echoes the cultural tenet of individualism and economic selfsufficiency that, while once an important feature of Quebec matrimonial
law, eventually became subordinate to the "agenda of protection 96 '. Justice
Deschamps' reasoning has thus been criticized not only by concurring
justices on the Court 197 , but also by scholars in family law. Notably, one
of the authors of the Advisory Guidelines issued a strong rebuke of Justice
Deschamps' reasoning, calling her unexplained exclusion of compensatory
support "baffling", and criticizing the decision as a whole as an abandonment of the Court's earlier functional approach to the family 198 .
The conceptual gaps between the prevailing approach to spousal
support in Quebec and that espoused by the Supreme Court and entrenched
in the Advisory Guidelines suggests that the Quebec approach may not
be reconcilable with either its own matrimonial law, or the federal law
governing divorce. Quebec's conception of spousal support as a measure
to respond to demonstrated need and to promote economic independence
aligns with the historic privileging of individual autonomy and free choice.
While rooted in notions of equality, principles of autonomy and freedom of
contract reflect a formal conception of equality 199, wherein the emphasis
lies on equal treatment under the law, regardless of its differential impacts
on different members of society 200 . As the Supreme Court has reiterated
on numerous occasions, however, the formal approach to equality-that
is, treating like alike-"is seriously deficient in that it excludes any consideration of the nature of the law 20 1". Rather, equality is to be understood
as remedial in nature20 2; "[c]onsideration must be given to the content of
the law, to its purpose, and its impact upon those to whom it applies20 3",.
Moreover, Moge is consistently understood as incorporating the principle
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Quebec (Attorney General)v. A, supra,note 17, par. 383, Deschamps J.
Id., par. 307.
Id.
Rollie THOMPSON, "Case Comment: Droit de lafamille 091768", (2013) 21 R.F.L.
(7th)325, 326.
See S. ENGEL, supra, note 22.
See Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, 56 D.L.R.
(4th)1.
Id., par. 166.
Id., par. 171.
Id., par. 168.
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of substantive equality into the law of spousal support and setting out the
idea that both spouses should experience the impacts of divorce in equal
ways 20 4. The same might be said of Bracklow, in its continued recognition
of the differential impacts of divorce on dependant spouses. Thus, the
compensatory and the interdependency models of spousal support, by
recognizing the potential for uneven economic consequences of divorce on
the spouses, ensure not merely that spouses are treatedequally, but that they
experience the impacts of divorce in substantively equal ways, accounting
for context and situational differences. These models-grounded in principles of substantive equality and fairness-are the models of spousal
support reflected in the Advisory Guidelines. Accordingly, the rejection of
the Advisory Guidelines in Quebec is misguided in its departure not only
from provincial law, but also from the federal law on divorce.
As mentioned above, Quebec resistance to the Advisory Guidelines,
while originating in the courts, is not limited to members of the province's judiciary. A number of family law scholars support the rejection
of the Advisory Guidelines. In 2016, four authors examined the relevance
of their application 2 5 . Commissioned by the Quebec Ministry of Justice,
the authors analyzed 565 divorce files spanning from 2008-2012, including
cases settled by agreement and by judicial order 20 6. The authors compared
both the settlements and the judicial awards with the awards that might
have been obtained pursuant to the Advisory Guidelines and concluded
that, "[manifestement], l'application des LDF [Lignes directrices facultatives] entraine ici une hausse non n6gligeable du montant des pensions
alimentaires entre 6poux207". In other words, the formulas contained in the
Advisory Guidelines cannot be said to reflect Quebec practice with respect
to spousal support, despite the claim, by the authors of the Advisory Guidelines, that they build on actual practice and aim to reflect current practice across the country 208 . The authors write: "les tribunaux qu6b6cois ne
semblent pas partager la lecture que font les auteurs des LDF lorsqu'ils
voient dans le 'partage des revenus' entre les 6poux un juste reflet de leur
204. See e.g. S. ENGEL, supra, note 22.
205. J. JARRY et al., supra, note 14.

206. Id., 251.
207. Id., 264.
208. Id. It bears mentioning that the study only examined cases applying the "without child
support" formula from the Advisory Guidelines - that is, the formula that applies in the
absence of a concurrent child support obligation. In failing to examine awards rendered
using the "with child support" formula, the study overlooks the fact that the vast
majority of decisions applying the Advisory Guidelinesemploy the "with child support"
formula. Specifically, twice as many cases are dealt with using that formula. See Carol
ROGERSON and Rollie THOMPSON, "Ten Years of the SSAG", presentation delivered at
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obligation alimentaire mutuelle 20 9". Ultimately, the authors agree that the
Advisory Guidelines should not apply in Quebec 210 .
While the study was descriptive, canvassing Quebec divorce cases
and comparing their outcomes with the ranges provided by the Advisory
Guidelines, the authors seem clear in their view that it is the Advisory
Guidelines that get things wrong, and not Quebec judges. As with judicial
views, however, that conclusion merits examination. The authors maintain
that a weakness of the Advisory Guidelines, insofar as they might apply
in Quebec, is their failure to contemplate or account for the mandatory
division of family patrimony, described above 211. What the authors seem
to overlook, however, is that while the rules are not as rigid outside of
Quebec-spouses may renounce family property in advance-all Canadian
provinces mandate the equal sharing of property upon divorce 212. While
the details of the different legislative schemes vary across the country, in
terms of what constitutes family or matrimonial property for the purposes
of sharing following a divorce, all spouses in Canada mandatorily share
equally in that property by default. Moreover, while spouses outside of
Quebec may renounce their claim to property sharing prior to the end
of the relationship-by concluding a domestic contract 213 , also known
as a cohabitation agreement or prenuptial agreement-most spouses do
not; only eight per cent of Canadian couples have a domestic contract
in place 214 . What is more, there will be many cases where insignificant

209.
210.

211.
212.
213.
214.

the Federation of Law Societies of Canada National Family Law Program, Whistler,
July 1 5th, 2014. This is unsurprising given the strong connection between parenting and
spousal support discussed in Moge v. Moge, supra, note 32.
J. JARRY et al., supra, note 14, 264.
Note, however, that authorities in Quebec are not, in principle, opposed to the use
of guidelines aimed at facilitating calculations of the financial consequences of
marriage breakdown. In its 2015 report, the Comit4 consultatif the chair of which also
participated in the 2016 study, in fact envision a set of mathematical formulas designed
do to just that. See Comit4 consultatif supra, note 55, Annexe VI. As the committee's
recommendations with respect to the economic consequences of family breakdown
were never implemented, neither were the proposed guidelines. The proposal, however,
may underscore the suggestion that it is not the Advisory Guidelines that attract
resistance in Quebec, but rather, the Supreme Court of Canada's interpretations of
the Divorce Act, which the Advisory Guidelines incorporate.
J. JARRY etal., supra, note 14, 264.
See e.g. Ontario's Family Law Act, supra,note 61, Part II.
See e.g. id., Part IV.
See Dani-Elle DUBE, "Should you get a prenup or cohabitation agreement before settling
down?", Global News, June 16 th , 2017, [Online], [www.globalnews.ca/news/3531241/
should- you- ge t-a- prenup- or- cohabitation- agreement- before- settling- down/]
(November 5 th , 2018) (citing an interview with John-Paul Boyd, executive director of
the Canadian Research Institute for Law and the Family at the University of Calgary).
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amounts of property mean that a family's most valuable asset will be a
spouse's income 215. In such cases, where families do not own property, or
where the value of any property would not suffice to compensate for losses
incurred during the marriage, division of family patrimony will offer little
relief to a financially vulnerable spouse.
Ultimately, the issue for both courts and scholars appears to be less
about the Advisory Guidelines than about the substance of the federal
law on divorce, as interpreted by the Supreme Court. The authors of the
2016 study write: "Si les dispositions relatives A l'obligation alimentaire
entre 6poux que pr6voit la Loi sur le divorce semblent faire l'objet d'une
interpr6tation diff6rente au Qu6bec, c'est sans doute parce que la port6e
des principes qui les fondent demeure discutable216". Guidelines endorsing
only one possible interpretation of a 30-year-old law will necessarily lead
to disagreement 217 . Indeed, the authors suggest that the concept of "merger
over time", which underlies the without child support formula, may not
correspond with social conceptions of the role of the spousal support
remedy in Quebec 218 .
Such a reading of federal divorce law as not directly applicable to
Quebec is not unique. Whether interpretations of family law emanating
from the common law provinces should apply in Quebec has been the
subject of judicial disagreement 219. In rejecting the application of federal
divorce law in Quebec, Justice Dalphond, then on the Quebec Superior
Court, relied on scholarship for the proposition that "la compl6mentarit6
du droit f6d6ral et du droit civil [...] doit &tre constamment entretenue,

215.
216.
217.
218.

C. ROGERSON, supra, note 22, 299, citing Moge v. Moge, supra, note 32, 849.
1 JARRY et al., supra, note 14, 264.
Id.
Id., citing Comit4 consultatif supra, note 55. Recall that the 2015 report commissioned
by the Quebec government placed the concepts of free will and contractual freedom
at the centre of the family.
219. For arguments that federal law is not directly applicable, see Droit de lafamille 562,
[2000] R.J.Q. 1560, [2000] R.D.F. 367; Droit de lafamille

C.A.); Droit de lafamille
see Droit de lafamille

608, [1989] R.J.Q. 522 (QC

427, [1988] R.J.Q. 119 (QC C.A.). For the opposing view,

1532, [1993] R.J.Q. 2712 (QC C.A.); Droit de lafamille

3462,

J.E. 99-2340 (C.S.) ("Pour les mesures accessoires pr6vues aux articles 15 et 17 de la
Loi sur le divorce, ce ne sont donc pas les principes du droit civil quebecois qu'il nous
faut appliquer, mais ceux de la Common Law"). Note that these decisions deal with
variations of prior awards based on agreements and not initial spousal support awards;
as mentioned earlier in the text, Quebec judgments on the latter question typically refer
to the applicable Supreme Court case law.
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r6affirm6e, sinon r6invent6e, pour demeurer vivante 220"' . Indeed, Professors
Brisson and Morel have maintained that federal and provincial law can
work together, when they promote the same objectives 221.
As seen, however, spousal support upon divorce is an area where the
federal and provincial laws part ways. Whereas Quebec family law is said
to promote individual autonomy, seeing the end of the marriage as the end
of the obligations of solidarity and support between the spouses 222, the
federal law has rejected such an understanding. Instead, the corollary relief
provisions of the Divorce Act have been understood as recognizing the
existence of an economic partnership, and as aiming to remedy financial
vulnerabilities that persist beyond a judgment in divorce 223 . To this end,
Brisson and Morel suggest that while it will often be appropriate to supplement federal law with provincial interpretations, section 15 of the Divorce
Act requires the federal law to function autonomously 224 . This is because
it is an example of a federal law that transcends Canadian legal traditions,
given its sui generis nature, distinct from both Quebec's civil law and the
common law of the other provinces 225. The application of federal law in
Quebec in not a simple matter. But the idea that provincial interpretations
should prevail with respect to spousal support as an incident of divorce is
not uncontroversial, suggesting that the rejection of the Advisory Guidelines based on that belief might not be taken as the conclusive word on
their application in Quebec.
Conclusion
A genuine understanding of the source of Quebec resistance can only
be gleaned from the wording of the relevant judgments themselves. While
it may be tempting to speculate about whether judicial attitudes stem from
some other issue with the Advisory Guidelines-forexample, the fact that
the Advisory Working Group that participated in their creation included
no members of the Quebec judiciary 226-grounding resistance in reasons
220. Droit de lafamille 562, supra, note 219, par. 65, citing Jean-Maurice BRISSON and
Andre MOREL, "Droit f6deral et droit civil: Complementarite, Dissociation", (1996)
75 Can. B. Rev. 297, 334.

221. Id., 326.
222. See J. PINEAU and M. PRATTE, supra, note 66, p. 318; S.A. c. J.D., supra, note 73
("Pendant le mariage, malade ou en sante, l'obligation alimentaire de l'un envers l'autre
subsiste. I1existe une pr6somption alimentaire mutuelle. Cependant, lors de lechec du
mariage, cette pr6somption ne s'applique plus", par. 59).
223. See Bracklow v. Bracklow, supra, note 65.
224. J.-M. BRISSON and A. MOREL, supra, note 220, 314, note 63.

225. Id., 314.
226. See Advisory Guidelines, supra, note 1, p. 157.
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other than those set out in judicial decisions would amount to conjecture. It
is nevertheless interesting to note that while no Quebec judges participated
in the creation of the Advisory Guidelines, the province was represented
by three jurists experienced in family law practice and mediation 227 . Moreover, the absence of judicial representation has not inhibited other courts
from endorsing the utility of the Advisory Guidelines.No New Brunswick
jurists participated in their creation, and yet, that province's Court of
Appeal was one of the first to approve of judicial reliance on their formulas
in determining an appropriate award 228 .Any response to judicial resistance
to the Advisory Guidelines in Quebec must accordingly be grounded in the
decisions addressing them.
This article has sought to demonstrate that the available critiques
of the Advisory Guidelines in Quebec-set out as they are in the relevant decisions-may not stand up to meaningful scrutiny, as they reflect
neither provincial matrimonial law nor federal divorce law. Instead, they
lend credence to the observation by the authors of the Advisory Guidelines that some of the criticisms of the Advisory Guidelines in Quebec
are "really criticisms of the current law" and, in some cases, reflect a
judicial preference for a non-compensatory approach to support 229. In an
area of shared federal and provincial jurisdiction such as spousal support,
resistance might then be anchored in an unstated rebuff of federal legislation dealing with a matter traditionally at the heart of provincial private
law. However, the non-compensatory approach adopted by some Quebec
judges, insofar as it is ostensibly rooted in Quebec family law, has little
foundation in the current context of the province's matrimonial law, save
for pre-existing interpretations of the alimentary obligation between separating spouses set out in the Civil Code. Moreover, while in the absence
of federal law on the subject, Quebec would be within its jurisdiction
in regulating family matters, the Quebec approach does not always give
sufficient weight to the existing provisions of the applicable federal law,
and their interpretation by the Supreme Court of Canada.
The legislative history that forms the background to the current
Quebec approach to spousal support illustrates the persistent contest in
Quebec family law between the cultural ideals of formal equality and
freedom of choice, on one hand, and a paternalistic legislative landscape
aimed at protecting the economically vulnerable, on the other. Indeed,
Quebec family law has consistently sought to balance cultural mores with

227. Id.
228. See S.C. v. J.C., supra, note 20.
229. Advisory Guidelines, supra, note 1, p. 22.
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protective legislative priorities 230 . This is not a novel issue. But at a time
when Quebec family law may be on the brink of legislative reform, and in
a context of broader national and international shifts in ways of thinking
about the family, attitudes toward the Advisory Guidelines provide a new
and relevant lens with which to approach these complex questions.

230. See B. MOORE, supra, note 87; Nicholas KASIRER, "The Dance is One", (2008)

20 L. & Lit. 69.
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